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PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION FOR HEALTH
Liza Vertinsky* & Reuben Guttman**
Abstract
Public health litigation can be a powerful mechanism for addressing
public health harms where alternative interventions have failed. It can
draw public attention to corporate misconduct and create a public record
of the actions taken and the harms done. In an ideal world, it could achieve
compensation for past harms and incentivize deterrence of future
misconduct. But the full public health potential of these lawsuits is rarely
achieved, even when the suits are brought on behalf of federal, state, and
local governments with the ostensible goal of protecting the health of the
citizens. The increasing involvement of private attorneys in public
litigation only adds to the challenges of using litigation to achieve public
health goals.
While there are continuing debates over the desirability of litigation
partnerships between state attorneys general (AGs) and private counsel,
as a practical matter, the involvement of private law firms in public
litigation is unlikely to disappear any time soon. This Article fills a critical
gap in the literature on the privatization of public litigation by showing
why, despite their shortcomings, arrangements between state and private
lawyers have the potential to satisfy public health goals that might
otherwise remain out of reach. It provides a theory of legal research and
development to show why these arrangements are not only likely to persist
but are also most likely to occur in high-impact public health litigation.
This Article then examines how the incentives of both state AGs and
private law firms influence choices along the litigation pathway in ways
that may undermine the potential to achieve public health value. It
concludes by proposing a novel impact-based approach to public-private
litigation, providing a decision-making framework that AGs can adopt to
increase the role of public health objectives in the litigation process.

*

© 2021 Liza Vertinsky. Associate Professor, Emory Law School.
© 2021 Reuben Guttman. Founding member of Guttman, Buschner & Brooks PLLC.
This Article draws in part from Mr. Guttman’s decades of experience representing numerous
whistleblowers under False Claims Acts in various states, working in partnership with state
attorneys general.
For their thoughtful comments and ideas, the authors would like to thank Margaret
Lemos, Eric Gold, and other participants of the 2020 Annual Health Law Conference,
Northeastern Center for Health Policy and Law, Michael Beckwith, Michael Burrage,
Miriam Weizenbaum, Eric Newman, Traci Buschner, Dan Guttman, Elizabeth Burch, and
participants in the Emory-UGA Summer 2020 workshop. We would also like to thank Mimi
Ramirez and Cole Garcia for their valuable research assistance.
**

1173

1174

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

INTRODUCTION
Litigation can be a powerful mechanism for addressing public health harms
where alternative regulatory approaches, such as administrative oversight and
enforcement, and the political will for legislative change fall short.1 The litigation
process can be used to draw public attention to corporate misconduct, create a public
record of the actions taken and harms done, achieve compensation for past harm,
incentivize deterrence of future misconduct, and encourage legislative and other
structural changes.2 Yet, the full public health potential of these lawsuits is rarely
achieved, even when the suits are brought on behalf of federal, state, and local
governments with the ostensible goal of protecting the health of the citizens in their
jurisdictions.3 The increasing involvement of private attorneys in litigation of
1

See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin, Law and the Public’s Health, 21 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH.
(Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Ariz. St. Univ.), Spring 2003, at 2 (“Of
the 10 great public health achievements of the 20th century, most were realized, at
least in part, through law reform or litigation: vaccinations, safer workplaces, safer
and healthier foods, motor vehicle safety, control of infectious diseases, tobacco
control, and fluoridation of drinking water.”) (emphasis added); W. E. Parmet & R.A.
Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437 (2000)
(“One of the most remarkable developments of the last three decades has been the increasing
use of litigation as a public health tool.”); S. Teret, Litigating for the Public’s Health, 76 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1027 (1986) (explaining that product liability litigation is an important part
of public health advocacy); Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public
Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & LAW 769
(1999) (concluding that “in general, public health goals are more directly achievable through
the political process than through litigation,” but that some circumstances are well-served by
litigation campaigns that “stimulate a national debate” and “move the policy agenda”). For
an international, perspective see, for example, LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS
BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (A. Yamin & S. Gloppen eds., Harv. Univ. Press 2011)
(examining the potential of strategic litigation to advance the right to health by increasing
government accountability); Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public
Health Through Litigation, 73 STAN. L. REV. 285, 285 (2021).
2
See, e.g., T. Ezer & P. Patel, Strategic Litigation to Advance Public Health, 20
HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 149 (2018) (exploring the avenues through which strategic
litigation can impact public health); Parmet & Daynard, supra note 1, at 437 (examining
ways in which public health litigation can be used to respond to public health harms);
Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michael R. Abrams, Settling the Score: Maximizing the Public Health
Impact of Opioid Litigation, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 701, 734 (2019) (“Litigation holds significant
public health potential in addressing the opioid crisis if pursued intelligently and
thoughtfully.”); Alexandra Lahav and Elizabeth Burch, Information for the Common Good
in Mass Torts, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing the powerful role of
litigation in creating public record of health and safety harms).
3
For a varied discussion of the role of litigation in achieving public health goals, see,
for example, Lawrence O. Gostin, John T. Monahan, Jenny Kaldor, Mary DeBartolo, Eric
A. Friedman, Katie Gottschalk, Susan C. Kim, Ala Alwan, Agnes Binagwaho, Gian Luca
Burci, Luisa Cabal, Katherine DeLand, Timothy Grant Evans, Eric Goosby, Sara Hossain,
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government interests only adds to the challenges of using litigation to achieve public
health goals.4
While an active debate remains over the desirability of the various partnerships
between government lawyers and private law firms that have emerged in many states
over the past few decades, public-private partnerships have remained an important
part of public health litigation.5 Much of the high-profile public health litigation in
Howard Koh, Gorik Ooms, Mirta Roses Periago, Rodrigo Uprimny & Alicia Ely Yamin, The
Legal Determinants of Health: Harnessing the Power of Law for Global Health and
Sustainable Development, 393 LANCET 1857, 1866 (2019) (discussing the potential of welltargeted strategic litigation, “e.g., proceedings that seek systemic change and remedies that
extend far beyond individual litigants” to advance public health); Michelle Mello, Jennifer
Wood, Scott Burris, Alexander Wagenaar, Jennifer K. Ibrahim & Jeffrey W. Swanson,
Critical Opportunities for Public Health Law: A Call to Action, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1979, 1979 (2003) (arguing that law remains an underutilized resource in public health);
Margaret Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 486 (2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation]
(discussing how AGs may be influenced by private incentives that may interfere with the
public interest focus of litigation); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Litigation to Make Public
Health Policy: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges in Assessing Product Liability,
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 556 (2004) (identifying limitations of
existing arguments for and against public health litigation); Rebecca L. Haffajee, The Public
Health Value of Opioid Litigation, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 279 (2020) (exploring
opportunities and limits of tort litigation in context of opioids); Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil
Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224,
224 (2002) (examining the pros and cons of litigation as a public health strategy).
4
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L. J. 515 (2016)
[hereinafter Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation] (examining the role of private law in
achieving public health interests and the trends and implications of different forms of
privatization of public litigation).
5
The expanding roles of private lawyers in public litigation and, in particular, the
relationships between state attorneys general and private law firms, has been explored by a
number of scholars, including: Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 517
(discussing the privatization of public litigation, where “government litigators aspire to do
more, they are increasingly turning to private resources—both human and financial—to
support their efforts”); see generally Myriam Gilles, The Politics of Access: Examining
Concerted State/Private Enforcement Solutions to Class Action Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
2223 (2018) [hereinafter Gilles, The Politics of Access] (exploring state/private enforcement
solutions to the problem of forced arbitration and class action bans); Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement of Group Rights in a Hostile
Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489 (2020) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui Tam]
(discussing enforcement gap and need for public-private litigation strategies); Eric Lipton,
Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-bycoaxing-attorneys-general-to-sue-.html [https://perma.cc/W5TF-LLPK] [hereinafter Lipton,
Lawyers Create Big Paydays] (discussing expanding collaborations between state AGs and
private law firms). For a discussion of state practices in allowing for AGs to hire private
firms, see Douglas McMeyer, Lise T. Spacapan & Robert W. George, Contingency Fee
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recent years involves a mix of state attorneys general (AGs) and private lawyers,
and where states band together to pursue multi-state litigation against large corporate
offenders, private-sector lawyers are inevitably found as part of the joint prosecution
effort.6
This Article begins by exploring the evolution of these public-private litigation
partnerships and the reasons why they are likely to persist. AGs and private law
firms have a shared interest in working together to litigate state interests, with AGs
leveraging the capacity and resources of the private sector and private law firms
benefitting from the enhanced access to the courts that working with AGs can
provide.7 In an era where courts have created procedural roadblocks that limit the
access of private litigants to the courts, AG involvement can be a game-changer in
litigation involving threats to public health.8 AGs have the authority, the legitimacy,
and sometimes the motivation to conduct investigations and pursue cases protecting
public health and welfare. But engaging in novel, high-impact public health
litigation requires concentrated investments in legal research and development
(R&D) and the capacity to carry out lengthy litigation battles. State AGs often lack
the resources, time, and staff needed to investigate shifting patterns of corporate
misconduct, develop novel legal theories in response, and then implement complex

Plaintiffs’ Counsel and the Public Good?, IN-HOUSE DEFENSE QUART. (Winter 2011)
(surveying contingency fee practices in different states and finding that most states allow the
practice).
6
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM:
TRENDS, TARGETS AND PLAYERS 139–56 (2013) (providing examples of private law firm
partnerships with AGs as part of a discussion of litigation trends); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM II: NEW TRENDS, TARGETS AND PLAYERS 95–109
(2014) (discussing plaintiffs’ bar alliance with AGs from a corporate defense perspective,
concerned with impact on corporate liability). Note that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has
been keeping an active watch on the partnerships between AGs and the plaintiffs’ bar as it
becomes an important mechanism for litigating public interests. See, e.g., Barry Meier &
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., States’ Big Suits Against Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/states-big-suitsagainst-industry-bring-battle-on-contingency-fees.html
[https://perma.cc/7H5F-Q83D]
(discussing the lobbying campaign by Chamber of Commerce seeking state restrictions on
use of contingency lawyers).
7
See, e.g., Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5, at 2232 (exploring mutual
benefits offered by state/private enforcement arrangements); Lipton, Lawyers Create Big
Paydays, supra note 5 (discussing expanding collaborations between state AGs and private
law firms).
8
See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy,
26 AM. J. L. & MED. 187, 187, 193 (2000) (documenting the story of failed private litigant
attempts to hold the tobacco industry accountable from 1954 to 1994, followed by a
breakthrough when AGs started bringing cases based on state Medicaid costs, where they
“broke the logjam of documentary deceit and concealment” and brought about “a sea
change” in the litigation).
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and sometimes risky litigation strategies.9 Private attorneys, in contrast, are
constantly searching for new large-scale litigation opportunities. They can provide
human and financial resources, and the more sophisticated firms have the incentive
and ability to invest in novel litigation opportunities that involve public health
harms—at least those of a type and magnitude with the potential to generate large
damage awards.10 Thus, while outsourcing public health litigation to private law
firms introduces its own set of challenges and concerns, it can also create mutually
beneficial opportunities for the state to leverage private legal R&D and litigation
capacity.11
After exploring the potential of such partnerships to achieve public health
objectives, this Article examines how the incentives of both state AGs and private
law firms influence choices along the litigation pathway in ways that may undermine
these objectives. It identifies key litigation decisions that will either directly or
indirectly impact public health goals and shows how the private incentives of both
public and private actors may lead to suboptimal decisions from a public health
perspective. Case selection, the transparency of discovery, decisions to settle,
damage modeling, and equitable remedies are now often determined with the
involvement of private attorneys and with private litigation norms and objectives in
mind.12 Litigation decisions are made with an eye to speedy resolution and expected
profits. Seemingly mundane decisions that arise along the litigation pathway can
have a potentially large impact on the public health value achieved in any particular
case. Even in the absence of private law firm involvement, the state litigation process
and results are often evaluated using limited metrics that heavily weigh damages and

9
See, e.g., Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5, at 2226, 2231–34 (discussing
how AGs can use relationships with private law firms to overcome resource constraints);
David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of
Substitute Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 427 (2010) (explaining that AGs
face shrinking budgets at the same time as they face a growing list of potentially big-ticket
claims involving public harms); see generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623
(2012) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman, After Class] (exploring the role of private lawyers
and public enforcement in parens patriae as a means of closing the enforcement gap).
10
See, e.g., Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays, supra note 5 (discussing expanding
role of private law firms working on contingency fee basis to bring cases in collaboration
with state AGs).
11
See, e.g., Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5, at 2231–34 (arguing for AG
use of contingency fee arrangements with private law firms as a way of addressing the
resource constraints that AGs face and expanding their enforcement capacity). For an
example of the role of entrepreneurial private lawyers in instigating public-private litigation
to pursue public interest, see generally Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public
Lawsuits: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY
129 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) [hereinafter Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits].
12
See, e.g., Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 548–50 (discussing
differences in work practices and litigation approaches between state and private attorneys).
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fail to account for the value of a robust public record and the potential for structural
changes to deter future misconduct.13
This Article concludes by proposing a novel approach toward public-private
litigation that is designed to increase the public health value of the litigation. We use
insights drawn from impact assessments and impact statements employed in other
areas of health and safety and environmental regulation to develop an impact-based
approach to health litigation. This approach provides a decision-making framework
that AGs can adopt to increase the role of public health objectives in the litigation
process.
With this final goal in mind, the rest of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part
I, we provide a brief overview of the evolution of private firm involvement in state
AG litigation and the intertwined evolution of litigation as a mechanism for
addressing corporate misconduct that harms public health. In Part II, we situate these
arrangements within the academic and policy debates over the privatization of public
litigation. We then offer a pragmatic theory of why they are likely to persist and,
moreover, why they offer the potential to achieve public health goals. In Part III, we
identify some of the tensions between private incentives and public objectives that
arise in these public-private litigation processes and show how these tensions may
limit the potential public health value of the litigation. Part IV develops an impactoriented approach to litigation decisions that is designed to increase the alignment
of the litigation process and its outcomes with public health goals. This approach is
offered as one way of ensuring that the public health impact is prioritized—or at
least emphasized—in both the process and outcomes of public health litigation.
Our analysis focuses on state AG litigation arrangements with private law firms
for two main reasons. First, many of the lawsuits with the largest potential public
health impact, suits we refer to as high-impact, involve state AGs and other
government agencies working with private law firms either directly or indirectly via
partnerships with other states utilizing private law firms.14 Second, the public

13

See, e.g., Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General
Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 STATE POL. & POL’Y QUART. 1, 20 (2010) [hereinafter
Povost, An Integrated Model] (explaining that state AGs “may incur a political cost by not
pursuing fairly easy money” in MDL); Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 2 (“This Article
argues, contrary to the conventional wisdom on the division between public and private
enforcement, that public enforcers often seek large monetary awards for self-interested
reasons divorced from the public interest in deterrence.”). The federal system is, generally,
not as concerned with the political fallout from its litigation decisions, and for better or
worse, this allows for greater freedom in case selection and disposition at the federal level.
14
See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Whistleblower-Initiated
Enforcement Actions against Health Care Fraud and Abuse in the United States, 1996 to
2005, 149 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 342, 342 (2008) (“Nearly all major cases today are
qui tam actions, involving whistleblowers with inside knowledge of the allegedly illegal
schemes.”). See also Ellen M. Gilmer, Big Law Builds Up State AG Expertise Amid
Enforcement Boost, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 12, 2021, 2:45 AM), https://news.bloomberg
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mandate and role of the state AG create opportunities to introduce public interest
oversight into the litigation process while continuing to leverage the resources and
expertise of private law firms.15 While we focus our attention on state AGs, the
issues we discuss are relevant to public-private partnerships at both federal and local
government levels as well, and the divergence of litigation incentives from public
health needs—and the consequent need for an impact-based approach—may be
present even in the absence of private law firm involvement.16 Finally, we focus on
cases that involve either a direct or indirect public health impact because of the
opportunities that these cases present for improving the standard of care, whether by
establishing prospective standards of care or by surfacing information that regulators
need to improve or revise existing standards of care.17
I. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE HEALTH LITIGATION
A. The Use of Private Law Firms to Litigate State Interests
State AGs are important participants in establishing and implementing health
policy.18 All fifty states, plus the District of Columbia and several U.S. territories,
law.com/environment-and-energy/big-law-builds-up-state-ag-expertise-amid-enforcementboost [https://perma.cc/JFH5-MDL4]; Bobby Harrison, New Boss Same as Old Boss When
It Comes to Mississippi’s AG Using Private Lawyers, MISSISSIPPI TODAY (July 5, 2021),
https://mississippitoday.org/2021/07/04/mississippi-still-using-private-lawyers/ [https://per
ma.cc/4N2A-U67W].
15
See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 9, at 671 (discussing oversight
role played by AGs in public-private litigation, acting, for example, as a filter in case
selection).
16
See, e.g., Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 3, at 486 (discussing how AGs
may be influenced by private incentives that create some of the same problems that arise
from relying on private lawyers in aggregate litigation).
17
See, e.g., Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does Medical Malpractice Law
Improve Health Care Quality?, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 142, 142 (2016) (emphasizing the
importance of tort litigation as a way of making substantive changes in the standard of care);
Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 385 (2015) (arguing that the relationship between medical liability rules and
healthcare spending can be substantial once the impact on standards of care is considered).
18
See, e.g., Lainie Rutkow and Stephen P. Teret, Role of State Attorneys General in
Health Policy, 304 JAMA 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Role of Attorneys General] (examining
the roles of state AGs in impacting health policy, including recent activism that focuses on
health care reform as well as more traditional roles to address corporate misconduct resulting
in harm to public health); Lainie Rutkow and Stephen Teret, The Role of State Attorneys
General to Promote the Public’s Health: Theory, Evidence, and Practice, PUB. HEALTH L.
RSCH. (Oct. 2010), http://publichealthlawresearch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/product
/The%20Potential%20for%20State%20Attorneys%20General%20to%20Promote%20the%
20Public%27s%20Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL98-XXTJ] (analyzing the current powers
that state AGs have and providing a framework for examining how the use of these powers
can benefit the public’s health).
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have their own attorneys general, forty-three of whom are elected, with the others
being appointed or chosen through special elections for terms that vary by state or
territory.19 As the chief law enforcer for the state, as well as its legal advisor, the AG
has a significant amount of prosecutorial discretion—including the right to bring
civil actions against private individuals, corporations, and even governments, on
behalf of the public interest of the state and its citizens.20 This gives the AG the
ability to influence health policy and engage in health advocacy in a variety of
different ways, one of which is to bring civil suits to address harms to the public
health of the state.21
Although the AG’s discretion in deciding when to bring a lawsuit and what suit
to bring may seem expansive, in practice, the AG faces a variety of practical
constraints and limitations. In particular, despite the fact that the vast majority of
AGs each serve over one million citizens, the AG does not have control over the
flow of resources available to fund the AG’s activities, hire more staff attorneys, or
invest in complex and expensive litigation.22 These constraints on resources may not
be a problem when handling routine enforcement of existing regulations in cases
with simple fact patterns, where cases can be investigated and tried quickly and
easily. But budget constraints limit the ability of the AG to develop and implement
novel and complex litigation strategies, particularly those involving the creative
application of old common-law theories to new fact patterns requiring intense
investigation and lengthy court battles. This limits the AGs’ ability to litigate on their
own in areas of corporate misconduct where the stakes are highest, the activities
most complex and difficult to police, and the regulations either inadequate or
challenging to enforce.

19

For facts about state attorneys general and their jurisdiction, see, for example, Find
My AG, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTYS GEN., https://www.naag.org/find-my-ag/ [https://perma.cc
/U8RP-PYNG] (last visited July 11, 2021); Attorney General Elections, NAT’L ASS’N OF
ATTYS
GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/news-resources/research-data/attorney-generalelections/ [https://perma.cc/TEP5-VURS] (last visited July 11, 2021).
20
See, e.g., What Attorneys General Do, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTYS GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag/faq/what_does_an_attorney_general_do.php
[https://perma.cc/76FL-LNGC] (last visited July 1, 2021).
21
For a discussion of the unique opportunities that state AGs have to support public
health policy solutions, see, for example, Rutkow & Teret, Role of Attorneys General, supra
note 18 (discussing innovative approaches used by AGs to protect health); Jennifer L.
Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Advancing Public Health Obesity Policy Through State
Attorneys General, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 426 (2011) (“State attorneys general have
a scope of authority that lies at the intersection of law and public policy, creating unique
opportunities that may not be available to other government officials.”).
22
See, e.g., Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5, at 2226, 2231–34 (discussing
the enforcement gap for AGs due to limited public resources and advantages of contingency
fee arrangements with private counsel); see generally Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra
note 3 (discussing AG use of private contingency-fee counsel to compensate for limited time,
money, and expertise in litigating certain large-scale projects).
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One way that AGs have responded to their resource constraints is through
exercising extreme discretion in case selection, at the risk of under-enforcement.23
Another way is through state statutes or agreements that allow AGs to tap the
resources of the private sector. These mechanisms include citizen suit provisions
that allow for direct private litigation, like qui tam suits under relevant False Claims
Acts, and procurement agreements between the government and private counsel,
often on a contingency fee basis.24 While the first mechanism relies solely on private
litigation to pursue state interests, the latter mechanism involves partnerships of
various sorts between the AG and private law firms. Many states have some kind of
False Claims Act that allows for qui tam suits by private citizens against companies
that are engaging in fraud against the government,25 and the state AG can choose
whether to intervene and work with private counsel or leave the case to the private
litigant.26 In addition, under the laws of most states, AGs can hire private law firms
to bring cases on their behalf, often on a contingency fee basis, as long as they retain
sufficient control over the key decisions in the lawsuit.27 It is these latter two
mechanisms—intervening in qui tam suits and hiring private law firms to bring
lawsuits on behalf of the AG— that this Article refers to as public-private litigation
“partnerships.” The relationships are governed by a mix of statutory and/or
contractual requirements that provide the framework within which the public and
private participants work together to pursue agreed-upon litigation goals.
For reasons further discussed below, the relative attractiveness of these latter
two litigation strategies for both AGs and private plaintiffs firms has increased over
time.28 When taking into account the extent to which state AGs join in existing
23

See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui Tam, supra note 5, at 510 (discussing how
state and AG financial and human resource constraints prevent AG offices from meeting
public enforcement action goals); see also Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 3, at 511
(“Resource limitations at the state level exacerbate the risk that public suits will generate
inadequate recoveries by giving public attorneys incentives to agree to the same sorts of
settlements that have drawn fire in the class action context.”).
24
See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is – And
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142–58 (2004) (discussing different ways in which
private law firms may litigate public (and state) interests).
25
More than twenty-three states have enacted State False Claims Acts, which allow for
suits where “government funds” have been impacted. See, e.g., United States v. NeifertWhite Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968). The qui tam provisions of false claims acts, both at the
federal and state levels, authorize private individuals (“relators”) to sue on behalf of state
entities for fraud in connection with the programs and expenditures of the state entity. If the
suit is successful, the relator is entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered by the state
entity, along with attorneys’ fees payable by the defendant.
26
See generally Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui Tam, supra note 5 (exploring the
arguments for and against this way of enlarging the role of citizens in prosecuting claims that
impact the public interest).
27
See, e.g., Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5, at 2231–34 (discussing viability
of state AGs to procure private counsel on contingency fee basis).
28
See generally Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 532–33, 538–46
(analyzing the costs and benefits of partnerships between public and private attorneys).
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litigation that involves partnerships between government prosecutors and law firms,
whether at the federal or municipal level or in other states with similar legal issues,
the role of public-private litigation partnerships in AG enforcement of state interests
is even greater.29
B. Tobacco Litigation: A New Paradigm and Its Limits
Mississippi Attorney General Michael C. Moore took on Big Tobacco and
came out smokin’.30
The modern evolution of what are now mainstream models of public-private
litigation involving state AGs working with private law firms has its roots in the
highly publicized tobacco litigation of the 1990s that resulted in multi-state
settlements by AGs against some of the nation’s largest tobacco companies (the
“Tobacco Litigation”).31 The Tobacco Litigation has been seen as a turning point in
attracting state AGs to get more involved in affirmative public health litigation. But
it was by no means the first instance of high-impact multi-state litigation by state
AGs, nor was it the only factor pushing AGs into a more aggressive health litigation
role. As early as 1907, state AGs banded together, bringing a multi-state antitrust
suit against Standard Oil.32 They subsequently formed the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) as a forum for sharing information and best practices
and coordinating multi-state action.33 In the 1970s, AGs relied on multi-state action
to take on large corporations such as General Motors.34 Prior to the 1980s, however,
with a few exceptions like the ones just mentioned, the role of state AGs as litigants
was largely a passive role, defending state agencies and state actors in lawsuits
brought against the state.
29

Many of the multi-state litigation efforts, such as litigation over tobacco and opioids,
are originated by private firms working in collaboration with one or two state AGs, leaving
many states—especially those not working with private counsel—to piggyback on the
existing case.
30
Gregory W. Traylor, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the Substance
of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2010). Mississippi, led
by its then-state AG Michael Moore, was the first state to bring a suit against tobacco to
recover for state Medicaid expenditures caused by the harms of tobacco.
31
See generally The Tobacco Settlement, STATEAG.ORG, https://www.stateag.org/init
iatives/the-tobacco-settlement [https://perma.cc/U4EZ-PDSV] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
32
State Enforcement Newsletter, AM. BAR ASS’N (2020), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/committee-newsletters/state-enforcement/
state-enforcement-newsletter-spring2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZMQ-XX5W].
33
See generally About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTYS GEN., https://www.naag.org/
about-naag/ [https://perma.cc/D3P3-F5SW] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
34
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Brumleve, The Evolution of the Scope and Political Ambition
of the State Attorneys General (Apr. 2016) (Honors Thesis, University of Drayton),
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/uhp_theses/76
[https://perma.cc/QU6A-FXJN];
Sarah
Harney, The Avengers General, GOVERNING (Oct. 27, 2010), https://www.governing.com/
archive/the-avenger-general.html [https://perma.cc/R248-QQ45].
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In the 1980s, AGs in at least some states began to take on a more significant
enforcement role in response to pressures to fill an enforcement gap arising from
both (1) barriers to the private consumer litigation that had changed public
expectations about the protection of consumer rights and policing corporate
misconduct, and (2) a massive wave of federal deregulation that allowed more
opportunities for corporate misconduct.35
Changes in public expectations about how consumer rights can and should be
protected began in the 1960s, as consumer rights pioneers such as Ralph Nader
began an era of consumer activism.36 Private litigation groups were formed to bring
consumer cases, and public campaigns were waged to change consumer perceptions
that corporations were protective of the health and safety of Americans. In Unsafe
at Any Speed, Nader challenged the conventional view that car accidents should be
attributed to the fault of the driver,37 and at a broader level, challenged the view of
corporations and their regulators as protective of the public interest. Nader inspired
a wave of consumer activists and trial lawyers to replicate the investigative and
litigation strategies that Nader demonstrated could be accomplished even by small,
low-budget legal teams.38 Nader and the lawyers he recruited, referred to as “Nader’s
Raiders,”39 provided successful models for how dedicated private-sector litigators
with limited resources could take on big corporations and their legions of lawyers in
court.40 The efforts of these consumer activists, combined with a burgeoning trial
bar looking for new cases to bring, produced a stream of successful consumer rights
cases that led to new standards of consumer protection by holding corporations

35

See generally Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note 13 (describing an expansion
of state AG role in litigating as a means of enforcing consumer interests, in response to a
weakening of federal enforcement efforts); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics, and the New
Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 552
(1994) (examining how changes in political context have led to state AGs assuming a more
coordinated and proactive role in litigation).
36
See, e.g., Parmet & Daynard, supra note 1, at 438.
37
See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965) (arguing that the reason for most car crashes was because
they were not designed with safety in mind).
38
Co-Author Reuben Guttman remembers visiting Nader’s Center for the Study of
Responsive Law in 1972, where office furniture included lawn chairs. See also The Art of
Public Interest Litigation, NADER.ORG, https://nader.org/2004/01/03/chapter-6-the-art-ofpublic-interest-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/4MGL-NH7X] (last visited July 1, 2021)
(recounting Alan B. Morrison’s experiences implementing Nader’s strategies at the private
firm Public Citizen Litigation Group, which impacted “so many different areas of law—
freedom of information, open government, union democracy, lawyers’ ethics, food safety,
occupational safety and health, the constitutional separation of powers”).
39
Julius Duscha, Nader’s Raiders is their name, and whistle-blowing is there game . . .,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/03/21/archives/stop-in-thepublic-interest-stop-in-the-public-interest.html [https://perma.cc/CX4A-CJF7] (explaining
the term “Nader’s Raiders”).
40
See id.
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accountable for public harms.41 Nader had shown that bringing consumer protection
cases against large corporations that engaged in misconduct was not only possible,
even for small law firms, but also potentially profitable. His work, and that of the
Nader’s Raiders he inspired and trained, provided the private sector with models
they could use to bring consumer protection cases, as well as ideas of where and
how to look for corporate misconduct and develop novel theories of harm.
Not surprisingly, the consumer activism of groups such as those created by
Nader, and the resulting increase in lawsuits against large corporations, led to a
backlash from corporations—and their industry organizations—faced with litigation
risks. Corporate lobbyists called for legal reforms to address what they presented as
a “tort crisis.”42 Efforts were made by corporate actors and their supporters to reduce
access to the courts by private litigants, and new conservative activist groups were
formed to reflect and protect corporate interests in opposition to consumer
activism.43 This opposition was successful; business interest weighed in heavily on
judicial selection and litigation processes, resulting in legal decisions that
significantly worsened the playing field for the consumer protection bar. These legal
decisions included changes to the summary judgment standards,44 changes that
allowed a judge to be the gatekeeper for experts,45 decisions curtailing the ability to

41

Nader’s cases and those brought by other groups led to changes in standards of care.
See, e.g., Mark Green, How Ralph Nader Changed America, NATION (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-ralph-nader-changed-america/ [https://perm
a.cc/DP3V-8KZU].
42
See, e.g., NAT’L LEGAL CTR. PUB. INT., A PLAN TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S SYSTEM OF
CIVIL JUSTICE FROM THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS: WILL IT HELP? WILL
IT BE IMPLEMENTED? 1–3 (1992); Dick Thornburgh, America’s Civil Justice Dilemma: The
Prospects for Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074, 1077 (1996) (“The defects in our civil justice
system have had a harmful effect on our economic competitiveness and, in turn, on our
economic growth and our ability to create and retain jobs. Litigation constitutes a hidden tax
on the American economy . . . . A good example of this flaw in the tort system is product
liability litigation.”).
43
The roadmap for this occurrence is, to some extent, laid out in the Powell Memo of
1971. See, e.g., Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor,
Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Com., Aug. 23, 1971,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellmemo/1 [https://perma.cc/P9QL-B4EW]. See
also Alexander J.S. Colvin and Katherine V.W. Stone, The Arbitration Epidemic, ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/
[https://perma.cc/KQ6P-HM9L]. For a discussion of how this trend has continued and even
increased, see, for example, Adam Winkler, Why Big Business Keeps Winning at the
Supreme Court, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/26/why-big-business-keeps-winning-at-the-supremecourt/ [https://perma.cc/4F7H-B8C2].
44
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317 (1986).
45
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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bring class actions,46 decisions making the pleading standards more stringent,47 rule
changes allowing appeal of class certification,48 decisions making discovery
“proportional,”49 and decisions channeling even public interest cases, including
consumer and discrimination claims, into compulsory arbitration.50
The plaintiff trial bar and the consumer groups that had been so successful in
the 1970s thus increasingly faced a judicial playing field tilted against them,
reducing their ability to bring and win consumer rights cases. During this time, the
full range of enforcement tools—even those contemplated by the authors of the civil
rights laws of the 1960s—was being reduced, limiting the role of the courts as a
vehicle for relief.51 This drop in the ability of private litigators to police corporate
misconduct created public and political pressure for state AGs to step in.
Government involvement in tobacco litigation was in part a response to the
inability of private plaintiffs to secure relief against large tobacco companies.52
Individual suits were filed in the 1950s after studies linking cigarettes to cancer
became public based on a variety of product liability, fraud, and negligence
theories.53 Tobacco companies threw massive resources into fighting these claims,
winning on defenses including “causation” and “assumption of risk” (i.e., that
smokers knew of the risks and decided to smoke anyway).54 A second wave of
private plaintiff lawsuits was brought in the 1980s, alleging that cigarette companies
knew but did not disclose the risks of smoking to consumers, but again the tobacco
46

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fiberboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1999); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
47
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009).
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); See also Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action
Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIR.
REV. 28 (2007).
49
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case . . . .”).
50
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
51
For example, much of the NAACP litigation that lead to the 1956 decision in Brown
occurred contemporaneous and subsequent to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. Those rules provided for “notice pleading” as confirmed and explained
by the Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41 47–48 (1957). The Court’s decision
in Twombly and Iqbal created a new standard giving the trial judge more discretion in
determining which cases move past the pleading stage. See Tombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678–680.
52
For a full timeline of tobacco litigation, see Inside the Tobacco Deal: Full
Chronology, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/time
lines/fullindex.html [https://perma.cc/QY3R-W9C2] (last visited July 1, 2021).
53
See, e.g., Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History and Development, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-development-322
02.html [https://perma.cc/AQ7R-6VRA] (last visited July 1, 2021) (discussing early suits
brought by private plaintiffs against tobacco companies in the 1950s).
54
Id.
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companies were successful in deflecting blame, with defenses including assumption
of risk and preemption of state laws by federal laws governing advertisements.55 A
third and finally successful wave of suits against tobacco companies occurred in the
1990s, after it was revealed that tobacco companies knew but did not disclose the
addictive nature of their products.56 At this point, state AGs got involved, bringing
actions under state consumer protection and antitrust laws alleging significant costs
to state public health systems.57 These state challenges, made largely on behalf of
state Medicaid systems, avoided the difficulties associated with having to prove
individual causation and overcame the tobacco defense of assumption of risk. It is
this third wave of lawsuits and, in particular, the culmination of some of these suits
in the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, that are most often referred to as the
Tobacco Litigation.
The Tobacco Litigation not only illustrated the power of litigation as a
mechanism for challenging the actions of a powerful industry,58 but also offered a
new paradigm for the use of private law firms working in partnership with state
AGs.59 An assortment of large private plaintiffs’ firms in different states entered into
contracts with state AGs to bring suits against the tobacco industry based on state
law arguments of public health harm. Together, they were able to develop a variety
of legal theories, including state consumer protection and antitrust claims arising
from costs imposed on state healthcare systems. They were also able to initiate
litigation on behalf of public third-party payors that had sustained economic injury
without any plausible argument that they had made the decision to assume any risk.
The late Ron Motley, who served as lead trial counsel for twenty-six state AGs
in the Tobacco Litigation that he helped to orchestrate, described the genesis of the
Tobacco Litigation as conceived by asbestos lawyers looking for new areas of
complex consumer protection litigation who took their idea to the state AGs.60 While
55

Id.
Id.
57
See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 8, at 192 (describing the dismal success rate of private
state tort claims against the tobacco industry from the 1950s to the 1990s, and suggesting
that this was the result of “a decades-long pattern of deliberate concealment,
misrepresentation and deception by the tobacco companies,” a trend broken by involvement
of state AGs litigating based on state Medicaid costs).
58
See, e.g., Steven A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2004) (“In the relatively few
countries that have antitobacco policies, government has provided the essential leadership;
the exception is the United States, where grassroots action and litigation by citizens have
generated most of the changes, including changes that were mediated by laws and
regulations.”).
59
See, e.g., Jacobson & Warner, supra note 1, at 770. As one important example, the
Tobacco Litigation established a paradigm for suits to recover on behalf of Medicaid
systems—a paradigm that permeates the world of False Claims Act litigation against large
pharmaceutical companies.
60
See, e.g., Frontline: Inside the Tobacco Deal Interview with Ron Motely (PBS
television broadcast May 12, 1998) https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settle
56

2021]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION FOR HEALTH

1187

governmental entities have long used the services of private counsel, at least through
hourly billing relationships, the Tobacco Litigation modified and solidified the
paradigm to include private counsel working on a contingency basis for government
actors to bring this kind of high-impact litigation.61 The shift to contingency fee
arrangements, with the associated possibility of obtaining multiplier fee recoveries,
increased the incentives for private firms to invest in high-impact litigation of state
claims.
For the AGs, the Tobacco Litigation offered an opportunity not only to recover
some money to compensate for the myriad of state expenses incurred because of the
health impact of tobacco but also to restructure the industry to prevent, or at least
limit, future harms. While some states settled earlier, in 1998, forty-eight states
entered into a Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement (MSA) with four of the largest
tobacco companies. At that time, this was the largest civil litigation settlement in
U.S. history.62 In addition to a minimum payment of $206 billion spread out over
time and across many states, the tobacco companies agreed to advertising
restrictions, funded educational programs, and dissolved industry organizations.63
Each of the states involved in the settlement retained the right to enforce the MSA
and related consent decree with respect to disputes impacting that state, with the
NAAG designated as the responsible party for implementing and coordinating
enforcement of the MSA on behalf of participating states.64
While the Tobacco Litigation—and the MSA that resulted—were lauded by
many as an example of the success of litigation in achieving public health goals, the
MSA had its critics even at the time of signing.65 The effectiveness of the MSA in
reducing harms from tobacco has subsequently been even more broadly
ment/interviews/motley.html [https://perma.cc/7MU8-Y2VM]; Ron Motley Bio, Motley
Rice LLC, https://www.motleyrice.com/attorneys/ronald-l-motley [https://perma.cc/AT62KGMG] (last visited July 9, 2021).
61
See id; Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits, supra note 11, at 130.
62
See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM,
THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW (2019), https://www.publichealth
lawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E
WD-G5F9].
63
See, e.g., Gregory W. Traylor, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the
Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1082,1099–1101 (2010)
(describing both the payment and regulatory provisions of the MSA, including the structure
and total value of the monetary settlement, advertising and marketing restrictions, and limits
to lobbying).
64
See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM,
supra note 62, at 7.
65
See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 8, at 188 (“The position advanced in opposition had
basically four points: (1) the State was getting far too little; (2) it was giving up far too much;
(3) the structured nature of the settlement meant that the State’s future interests were aligned
with, indeed dependent upon, future success in tobacco sales, an exact reversal of existing
health policy; and (4) the kinds of determinations underlying the MSA were essentially
legislative, and well beyond the adjudicative and enforcement capabilities of a single judge
sitting in a lower court of general jurisdiction.”).
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questioned.66 Although the MSA did impose a large monetary penalty on tobacco
companies, the companies remained operational and free to continue producing
cigarettes, and the MSA settlement funds were not adequately tied to the goal of
reducing the rate of smoking.67 Indeed, the funds were largely unrestricted and
quickly became deployed by states for purposes other than addressing the harms of
tobacco.68 The monetary payouts to states might have even created perverse
incentives for states to protect the tobacco industry in order to sustain a continuing
flow of MSA funds.69 While the ambitions for structural change to the tobacco
industry were high, interests in securing a large monetary settlement without further
delay ultimately dominated in the resolution of these cases.
Despite its limits as a mechanism for controlling the harms of tobacco, the MSA
was viewed as a success story by many of the participating AGs. They were able to
claim credit for achieving a landmark settlement and for appearing to address
widespread public health harms from tobacco, as well as providing a welcome flow
of funds to state budgets. After this widely publicized settlement, the model of state
AGs working with private law firms, most often on a contingency fee basis,
continued to evolve in response to pressures on both private law firms and state AGs.
The novelty of the litigation and the magnitude of potential recovery allowed for
under contingency fee arrangements impacted the way both AGs and private firms

66

See, e.g., Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 2, at 703–04 (describing some of the limits
of the Tobacco Litigation and implications for thinking about the multi-state opioid
litigation).
67
See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 58, at 294–95 (“Many tobacco-control elements that
had been part of the general settlement were dropped from the MSA; these included the
assignment of jurisdiction over tobacco to the FDA, strengthened warnings on packages of
tobacco, tighter enforcement of rules banning the sale of tobacco to minors, and strong
regulations in support of clean indoor air. The MSA also included language that later
hampered efforts aimed at tobacco control.”).
68
See, e.g., Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 2, at 710 (discussing the limitations of the
MSA in the Tobacco Litigation); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-534T,
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATE’S ALLOCATIONS OF PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005 6 (2007) (finding that, from 2000 to 2005, only
3.5% of total MSA revenues were spent on tobacco control programs, while 22.9% went
towards state budget gaps, 7.1% towards “general purposes,” and 6% towards
“infrastructure”); Andrew J. Haile and Matthew W. Krueger-Andes, Landmark Settlements
and Unintended Consequences, 44 U. TOL. L. REV 102, 103 (Sept. 27, 2012) (“[I]n 2011 the
states collectively used less than 2% of their annual MSA payments for smoking control and
prevention programs.”).
69
See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 58, at 295 (noting that some states have mortgaged
their future payments from the MSA through bond issues backed by state tax revenues,
creating perverse incentives for these states to keep tobacco companies healthy in order to
avoid having to bear the financial obligations they would assume should the tobacco
companies forfeit MSA payments).
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approached their relationship with each other and their roles in the shared litigation,
resulting in a new paradigm of public-private health litigation.70
Since the Tobacco Litigation, private plaintiffs’ law firms searching for new
complex litigation opportunities and state AGs interested in leveraging their
enforcement ability in court have continued to work together to litigate state
interests, particularly in high-profile litigation such as the multi-state opioid
litigation.71 Building on past experiences, some of the same individuals who took on
leadership roles in the tobacco litigation, including some former AGs who are now
private lawyers, have been involved in public-private coalitions designed to go after
opioid manufacturers.72
C. The Growth in Public-Private Health Litigation
1. Private Law Firms Leveraging Public Access to the Courts
Citizen suits, such as the first and second waves of individual lawsuits brought
against tobacco companies, rely directly on private litigation targeting companies
that engage in harmful activities such as misrepresenting the safety of a drug or
medical device, product defects, or adulteration of the products. Since pursuing these
lawsuits is costly and it is difficult for an individual plaintiff to win against large
corporate interests, law firms have relied on the ability to aggregate the claims of
multiple plaintiffs through class actions to make lawsuits economically viable. But
a series of Supreme Court decisions starting in 1999 and continuing into the
following decade have created a variety of procedural barriers to class action suits.73
Additional procedural changes, such as the allowance of appeals from orders
denying or granting class certification, have added potential delays in the trajectory

70

See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft,
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 16–18 (2000) [hereinafter Erichson, Coattail Class Actions] (examining how the
tobacco settlement set the precedent for AG hiring of contingent fee-based private attorneys).
71
See, e.g., Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 2, at 704.
72
See, e.g., Esmé E Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco Takes
On the Opioid Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobaccotakes-on-the-opioid-industry [https://perma.cc/7XDL-6N7A] (“‘Litigation is a blunt
instrument; it’s not a surgical tool,’ Moore says. ‘But it provokes interest quicker than
anything I’ve ever seen.’”); see also Ronald L. Motely’s Bio, MOTLEY RICE
https://www.motleyrice.com/attorneys/ronald-l-motley [https://perma.cc/R2ZE-58RK] (last
visited July 7, 2021).
73
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 733,
745–61 (2013).
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of class action cases, requiring the plaintiff firms pursuing class actions to carry costs
and attorney’s fees on their books for a longer period of time.74
One result of the increasing barriers to class actions has been a shift from class
actions to the multi-district litigation (MDL) that now predominates in the federal
court system.75 But MDLs are imperfect substitutes for the class action suits that
private plaintiffs’ lawyers might have previously relied upon because they lack the
efficiencies that made class actions so valuable,76 as well as the safeguards that
protected individual plaintiffs.77
Sector-specific legal barriers have also made it harder for plaintiff firms to bring
certain kinds of complex litigation, pushing plaintiff firms specializing in these areas
to diversify. The passage of the Public Securities Law Reform Act, for example,
along with cases requiring the need to demonstrate loss causation,78 have made
securities litigation more speculative and costly. This has pushed firms specializing
in these complex cases to diversify into new areas such as healthcare litigation.79
Meanwhile, private law firms thriving on medical malpractice and consumer fraud
have had their business model threatened by damage caps, compulsory arbitration,
and barriers imposed on medical malpractice cases, leading them to join the search
for alternative litigation areas and strategies.80
74
See, e.g., Matthew Perlman, Mylan, Pfizer Want EpiPen Row Paused for Class Cert.
Appeal, LAW360, https://www.law360.com/articles/1255068?utm_source=ios-shared&utm
_medium=ios&utm_campaign=ios-shared [https://perma.cc/AVR3-F5Z8] (last visited July
7, 2021).
75
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 72 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation] (“And
from 2002 to 2015, multidistrict proceedings leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine percent of the
federal courts’ entire civil caseload.”).
76
While class actions allowed plaintiffs firms to focus on a limited number of class
representatives, MDLs require a high volume of individual plaintiffs, each of whom is an
individual client.
77
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in
Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1449 (2017)
(arguing that the role of repeat players in MDLs and the control exercised by lead attorneys
can lead to settlements that benefit the leaders and defendant at expense of claimants);
ELIZABETH BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MDLS (Cambridge
University Press, 2019) [hereinafter BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS] (reviewing MDLs and how
they may fall short of serving plaintiffs’ interests).
78
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 US 336 (2005).
79
In 1995, Congress passed the Public Securities Law Reform Act (PSLRA), which
was essentially designed to hinder the ability of small shareholders to bring class action
securities cases. See Public Securities Law Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). The PSLRA created a sixtyday holding period after the initial complaint is filed. The court then chooses as the lead
plaintiff—and its law firm—the plaintiff or plaintiff group with the biggest losses. The result
of the congressional effort to kill these class actions was to put them in the hands of large
institutional investors: first the Taft Hartley Fund and then public pension funds.
80
See, e.g., Clifton Barnes, Tort Reform Slowed but Not Stopped, 29 ABA J. No. 6
(2005) (discussing trends and impact of medical malpractice tort reform).
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In addition to barriers to class actions and legal changes targeted at areas such
as securities litigation and medical malpractice, plaintiffs’ law firms have faced
changes in the law that make it harder for them to bring cases even on behalf of
individual private plaintiffs. One of the most significant roadblocks to private
litigation is the heightened pleading standard established by the Supreme Court
cases of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly81 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.82 These cases threw out
the decades-old notice pleading standard83 and replaced it with a requirement that
plaintiffs provide factual support for a plausible claim for relief without the benefit
of discovery.84 This change in pleading standards gave the trial court an expanded
role in determining which cases could be pursued beyond the initial complaint.85
These various barriers to private plaintiff litigation have encouraged private
plaintiffs’ firms to explore business opportunities for pursuing litigation in
partnership with AGs, either through securing the intervention of AGs in qui tam
suits or on a contract basis in cases brought by AGs. State AGs can bring lawsuits
on behalf of state citizens, allowing them to avoid the difficulties of class
certification. The increased pleading standards also have less impact on cases
brought by state AGs because they can engage in investigations and subpoena
information before filing a complaint, allowing them to obtain facts useful in
supporting the claims they make. In addition, having the state AG as the plaintiff
may add legitimacy to the claim, giving it the aura of plausibility for a judge with
the discretion to determine whether the plausibility standard has been satisfied.
Litigating state interests also offers opportunities for addressing issues of
causation and developing novel legal theories based on state-based harms. Where
causation might be difficult to establish for individual plaintiffs, state-interest claims
can be based on state harms such as state Medicaid expenditures.86 In later phases
81

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Twombly and Iqbal cases overturned a long-established
notice pleading standard established in Conley v. Gibson. Under the new standard, the court
must now engage in a two-pronged analysis. First, the court must strip out all conclusory
allegations. Second, assessing only the factual allegations, the court must determine whether
the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679–81 (describing the correct
standard as a “two-pronged approach” and proceeding to identify and reject conclusory
allegations before turning to the sufficiency of the remaining factual allegations).
83
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
84
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 19 (Oct. 2010) (“After Twombly and
Iqbal, mere notice of a claim for relief likely does not satisfy the Court’s newly minted
demand for a factual showing.”).
85
See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal,
Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 VILLANOVA L. REV. 857, 858–59
(2012).
86
See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 8, at 187–93 (providing the historical context for the
tobacco litigation brought by state AGs); Erichson, Coattail Class Actions, supra note 70, at
10 (describing the ways in which state AGs were able to succeed in bringing claims against
tobacco industry where private litigants had failed).
82
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of the case, state AGs can avoid negotiations over the admission of expert witnesses
by relying instead on the expertise of the state agencies involved in the case.
Finally, where defendants are large and well-resourced and the harms arising
from their misconduct are diffused across state lines, private law firms can build
coalitions of state AGs and other private law firms to increase both the resources
available to litigate and the willingness of the defendants to enter into settlements.
Taking these factors into account and adding the opportunities for larger recoveries
allowed under contingency fee arrangements, state AGs become valuable targets for
private plaintiffs’ law firms with the capacity to engage in complex healthcare
litigation.
2. State AGs Leveraging Private Sector Resources
At the same time as plaintiffs’ law firms have looked elsewhere for avenues to
pursue large, complex product liability suits, state AGs with growing responsibilities
and ambitions have become more interested in exploring new ways of litigating state
interests with the use of private sector resources.87 As discussed earlier, the drop in
the ability of private litigators to police corporate misconduct created public and
political pressure for state AGs to step in. There were both public expectations that
consumer rights would be protected and pressures on the state AGs to address harms
to their citizens in the vacuum left by the thwarting of private plaintiff suits. At the
same time as barriers were being erected to prevent consumer litigation, the role of
government regulation was also being rolled back. The massive corporate
deregulation that took place in the 1980s, along with the formation of barriers that
prevented private litigation from being an alternative enforcement mechanism, led
the state AGs to take on a greater enforcement role to fill the void.88 In the wake of
the Tobacco Litigation, state AGs came to see high-impact litigation as an attractive
way of showing that they were successfully combatting misconduct that harms the
state, and many became adept at claiming credit for the money that could be returned
to the state through such litigation.89
In many states, the office of the state AG expanded, resulting in a larger number
of staff attorneys and a larger budget for launching investigations and bringing cases.
However, the capacity of the state AG’s office by no means matched the scope of

87

See Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys
General as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1235–36 (2015) (examining growing
responsibilities, as well as ambitions and activism, of state AGs).
88
See, e.g., Colin Provost, When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?, Ambition and
Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 6 (2010)
[hereinafter Provost, When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?] (discussing emergence and
increase of MDL in part as a response to weakening of federal enforcement in the 70s–80s).
89
See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 853, 855, 855 n.6 (2014) (offering examples) (“In the years since the tobacco
litigation, state AGs have become adept at using large monetary recoveries to publicize the
financial contributions they make to the state and its citizens.”).
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their enforcement role.90 The enforcement needs far exceeded the resources
available to the AGs. With an existing array of statutory and enforcement
obligations, a higher overhead than that of the consumer activists, and a need to
generate short-term results in time for election deadlines, the gradual gravitation of
the AGs toward a relationship with the private plaintiffs’ bar was almost inevitable.
The attractiveness of working with private firms on a contingency basis, or
intervening in suits initiated by private firms, was twofold: (1) because private
counsel would work on a contingency fee basis and advance costs, there was no
drain on the AG’s budget; and (2) the AG could rapidly launch novel cutting-edge
litigation and take credit for its launch and/or conclusion. The private attorneys and
the state AGs thus had a shared motivation to work together to litigate state interests,
driving the growth in public-private litigation relationships.
II. COMPETING THEORIES OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION
As the confluence of the factors discussed above has pushed both private
counsel and state AGs to investigate new ways of working together to bring public
litigation,91 concerns about these public-private models have joined a broader
academic and policy debate about the respective roles of the private and public sector
in lawmaking. This Section begins by situating arrangements between private law
firms and AGs in the litigation of state interest within this broader debate. It then
offers as an alternative a pragmatic theory of why these arrangements are likely to
persist and why they offer at least the potential for responding to public health harms
that might not otherwise be addressed.
A. The Debate over Privatizing Public Litigation
There is a longstanding and wide-ranging debate over when, how, and even
whether the private sector does and should have a role in public lawmaking.92 The
90

This is particularly true in the age of electronic discovery, where document
production is extensive, and it takes the assembly of “war rooms” of attorneys to review
documents.
91
See generally Gilles, The Politics of Access, supra note 5.
92
The literature includes law and economics arguments about the comparative
efficiency of alternative systems of law enforcement, jurisprudential views about lawmaking
and the public interest, and pragmatic approaches that recognize the messy, hybrid nature of
current enforcement. To list just a few examples, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669
(1986) (examining heavy reliance of the U.S. system on private litigants to enforce public
law); see generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (discussing when and why private plaintiff-driven
litigation has become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation); see generally
THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
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debate surrounds a number of topics, ranging from very broad views about the
privatization of lawmaking and the ways in which private firms may pursue public
rights93 to more specific and granular concerns with the ways in which private law
firms are hired to pursue state interests and how much they get paid.94 While the
issues and concerns raised vary, most, if not all, of the arguments against private law
firm involvement share common concerns about private actors controlling
inherently public functions and using this control for private gain. Often, the debates
involve normative assessments of whether and how private law firms might distort
the development and enforcement of public law.95 In more recent literature, there is
a growing (although by no means new) acknowledgment of the hybrid nature of
regulatory regimes, with overlapping and intertwined public and private
mechanisms of enforcement.96
The use of private law firms to litigate state interests falls squarely within the
debate over the privatization of public law. Where the AG hires a private law firm
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2004) (examining the role of laws that promote private
litigation as a mechanism for resolving disputes and the U.S. court-centered public policy
approach); Rubenstein, supra note 24, at 2142–58 (discussing the public-private distinction
in the lawyering literature and exploring the concept of private attorney general, construed
broadly as players who mix public and private functions, and providing taxonomy of
different types of private attorney general who serve different functions); Wilkins, supra note
9, at 425 n.10, 428 (examining a growing tendency by governments at all levels to hire
private lawyers to act as “substitute” attorneys general to pursue public claims against private
defendants, and arguing for a new “set of institutional arrangements and ethical norms” that
can help lawyers “conceptualize and discharge” their competing and “often conflicting
public and private responsibilities”). For a discussion of how to think about private
“lawmaking,” see, for example, David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371,
373–74 (2003) and Kimberly N. Brown, Public Laws and Private Lawmakers, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 615, 619–45 (2016). For a foundational discussion of the privatization of public
functions, see generally DANIEL GUTTMAN & BARRY WILNER, THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT:
THE GOVERNMENT’S MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR GIVE AWAY OF ITS DECISION-MAKING
POWERS TO PRIVATE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, “EXPERTS” AND THINK TANKS (1976).
93
For a variety of different views on the role of the private sector in lawmaking and
litigation, see, for example, Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 515–82
(arguing that the increasing use of private resources to fund and conduct public litigation
may interfere with the focus of the litigation on the public interest); Snyder, supra note 92,
at 372, Part VII) (arguing that a significant amount of law is privately made and that its
legitimacy may depend on competition).
94
See, e.g., Erichson, Coattail Class Actions, supra note 70, at 35–36 (discussing the
debate over contingent fee private attorneys in public suits and concerns over skewed
incentives). See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 518–19 (discussing
the advantages and issues relating to privatizing public litigation).
95
See, e.g., Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 515–82.
96
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE
L. J. 530 (2013) (“Indeed, many of our most consequential regulatory regimes have evolved
in recent decades into hybrids of public and private enforcement in which multiple
enforcers—including federal and state administrative agencies, private litigants, and state
attorneys general—operate and interact within complex ecologies of enforcement.”).

2021]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION FOR HEALTH

1195

to bring litigation on its behalf, there is a concern about the privatization of
inherently governmental functions and an underlying assumption that the presence
of the private firm will alter the litigation trajectory.97 The AGs must retain control
over the lawsuits even when they contract out the work, and so, at least theoretically,
the decision to bring a case and retain counsel to help litigate it is a public decision
made by the AG. But where the idea for the litigation and the R&D to support it are
developed by a private law firm that proposes the idea to a state AG, the private law
firm is influential in driving case selection. Moreover, although contracts with
private counsel require AGs to play a supervisory role in the litigation, the ability to
do so effectively is diminished when the information central to the unfolding
litigation is developed outside of the AG’s office. As the litigation progresses, unless
the AG’s attorneys are inserted into the litigation process and follow the facts and
details of the case, real oversight is hard to accomplish, and the private law firm is
effectively in control of the case.
This impact of outsourcing on the litigation pathway, beginning before the case
is even selected, raises important concerns about the privatization of a public
function. The rule of law is embedded in statute, regulation, and common law.
Oftentimes, AG opinions form the basis of how law or regulation is to be interpreted.
When an AG chooses to litigate, the act of litigation is itself both an interpretation
of the law and an effort to confirm that interpretation through judicial affirmation.
Hence, when private lawyers are working with AGs in ways that impact key
litigation decisions, they are involved in creating law. In our existing system, private
counsel has the right to do this through private litigation. But when litigation is
commenced on behalf of a public client, one whose opinion about the application of
or extension of law bears some weight, the private law firm is effectively influencing
the public lawmaking role.98
B. A Pragmatic Approach: Leveraging Legal R&D to Litigate State Interests
While the merits of private law firm involvement in public litigation will no
doubt continue as a subject of academic and policy debate, at a pragmatic level, the
relationships between AGs and private law firms are likely to persist, if not expand,
for the reasons discussed at length in Part I. Given that these arrangements are here
to stay, at least for now, this Section develops a pragmatic theory of how they are
used to pursue high-impact litigation.
One of the driving factors behind AG interest in private law involvement is the
limited resources that enforcement agencies have to monitor corporate misconduct
and the limited resources that AGs have to pursue litigation where the public has
been harmed. The role of corporate actors in fueling the financial crisis of 2008 and
97
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons from
Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (2014) (providing an empirical examination of
private pathways of litigation under False Claims Acts, finding that while private suits may
not be inefficient, they do impact the litigation pathway in important ways).
98
See, e.g., Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 4, at 515.
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the ongoing opioid epidemic offer salient examples of corporate misconduct that
went unchecked for decades before state intervention occurred.99 Many more
instances of corporate misconduct fly under the radar of agency enforcers and
continue unabated. The capacity of enforcement agencies in areas relevant to public
health remains far below the need for proper enforcement, leaving the state AGs
with a vast territory of public health harms to investigate and pursue.100 They are
faced with a broad array of duties and stakeholder interests and a limited budget and
staff, and out of this array of considerations and constraints, they must decide how
much time and money to dedicate to affirmative civil enforcement.
While AGs have advantages over private plaintiffs in accessing the courts, they
don’t necessarily have the resources and expertise to develop the types of novel
claims that lead to high-impact litigation or the ability to carry out lengthy and
expensive litigation. In contrast, the investments needed to identify and develop
novel legal theories and legal strategies, or what we refer to as legal R&D, are a
central part of the business model for private plaintiffs’ law firms. These firms must
continually invest in the development of new legal theories and case strategies and
adapt existing theories and strategies to new areas of harm in order to generate
business.101
There are at least four types of legal R&D involved in developing novel cases:
(1) identifying patterns of misconduct that cause harm for which recovery can be
sought; (2) developing legal theories of recovery; (3) finding the facts needed to
support the legal theories; and (4) using expert analysis to identify harm, prove
causation, and establish measures of harm. All this research becomes the foundation
for a carefully constructed complaint and a litigation strategy designed to yield a
profitable result for the firm. Expectations about profitability drive R&D decisions
about what areas and which cases to investigate and pursue. There are scale
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See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Chelsea L. Gulinson, Leila Barraza, Walter G. Johnson,
Drew Hensley & Haley R. Augur, Exploring Legal and Policy Responses to Opioids:
America’s Worst Public Health Emergency, 70 S.C. L. REV. 3, Part II (2019) (exploring
inadequacies of the legal responses to the opioid epidemic); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise
Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecution of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html [https://perma.cc/3S4C9QLV] (exploring the inadequacies of regulation before and after the financial crisis of
2008).
100
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1214 (1982) (“Public enforcement is, however, frequently
inadequate because of budget constraints . . . .”).
101
See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as
Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733, 736–37 (2004) (discussing investments made by private
law firms in developing new class action cases, suggesting the use of intellectual property
protection as a mechanism for protecting this investment and incentivizing the R&D needed
to develop these novel cases); Thomas G. Field, Jr., Lawyers Should Be Cautious When
Copying Other Lawyers’ Work, IP MALL, https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/host
ed_resources/field/22-AttyWork.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB59-8BJF] (last visited July 7,
2021) (discussing implications of using other lawyers’ research and work product).

2021]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION FOR HEALTH

1197

economies in much of this activity, allowing firms to recoup up-front costs over time
in repeat litigation.
The first component of this legal R&D involves the use of past experience and
current research to inform pattern recognition. Plaintiffs’ trial firms are constantly
looking for patterns of misconduct in new contexts that have become familiar to
them as a result of past cases. Here, the role of experience is particularly valuable,
and litigation teams will inevitably include seasoned trial lawyers who have been
trained to spot patterns of misconduct.
The second component involves the use of experience drawn from prior cases
in combination with the development of new legal theories to identify a legal
remedy—a remedy that includes adequate potential for recovering sizeable
monetary damages. This often involves delving into old common law principles and
applying them to new contexts and finding new fact patterns that might fit legal
theories developed in other circumstances. For example, the Oklahoma opioid
litigation involved the application of age-old theories of nuisance to the marketing
and distribution practices of opioid manufacturers and distributors.102
The third component involves focusing on the legal remedy. If firms do this,
they can invest in culling out the facts from public records and other sources, most
of which involves piecing together circumstantial evidence, to support the legal
theories.103 Plaintiff firms also have the ability to cull facts from existing bodies of
litigation that they have undertaken. These firms mostly operate on a contingency
basis, so their business model is not, in the short term, securing an economic hourly
return on each hour spent accumulating potentially useful data. Nor do they have to
show results that are timed to coincide with an election or re-appointment cycle. But
ultimately, the investment does need to translate into a lawsuit with an expected
payoff large enough to justify the large, up-front investment in R&D.
The fourth component is two-fold: (1) private law firms have the resources to
finance the overhead of large cases; and (2) they have existing relationships with
experts who can help identify wrongdoing or demonstrate causation and damages.
They also have the capacity to scale up their R&D activities rapidly where needed,
without facing the kinds of contracting or budget constraints that AGs might
encounter.104
This process of legal R&D can be expensive and time consuming, and the
benefits of this work may not be realized in any one case. Often, firms depend on a
102

See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 617 (5th ed. 1984).
103
Most complex cases are premised on a massive aggregation of circumstantial
evidence often tied together with expert testimony, as permitted under the test for relevant
evidence under FED. R. OF EVID. 401.
104
Consider, for example, a plaintiff’s firm that wanted to sue a major retailer because
the children’s toys produced by the retailer contained lead paint. The law firm could buy toys
and send them to a lab for rapid analysis. It could then begin research on the nature and
operations of the distribution chain and hire investigators to collect information about sales
practices. Meanwhile, the law firm could task associates to develop a memo on legal theories
or create a coalition of firms with expertise in toxics or metals litigation.
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portfolio of relevantly similar cases when litigating. Private law firms can spread the
cost of this legal R&D and the expense of maintaining litigation capacity across
multiple lawsuits that rely on similar strategies, benefiting from the prior experience
of senior litigators and from scale economies in at least some aspects of the litigation
process. Once a litigation team has invested time and money in developing expertise
in a particular area, they have an interest in identifying as many cases as possible
that share a commonality of legal and factual issues. Once a particular avenue of
litigation has concluded, such as the long series of asbestos actions or tobacco
litigation, the private plaintiffs’ lawyers have incentives to find new areas of
corporate misconduct that might be susceptible to relevantly similar legal arguments
and strategies. Firms have an institutional memory that is comprised of lawyers who
are repeat players in multiple cases over long periods of time and the use of internal
firm databases that codify information and trial practices. Relationships with experts
in the field become part of this institutional memory or knowledge. The lead lawyers
in the Tobacco Litigation, for example, were successful asbestos lawyers who were
initially drawn to the tobacco cases because they knew that cigarettes had an asbestos
component. But, of even more importance, they had grappled for years with matters
of causation, including the battle of scientific experts in proving causation. They
thus quickly recognized that finding a third-party-payor client in the form of State
Medicaid funds would eliminate the causation hurdles in tobacco cases, just as they
had in asbestos cases.
In sum, for the private law firm, partnering with AGs includes the following
advantages: (1) eliminating defenses and procedural barriers; (2) legitimizing
claims; (3) providing court access for large damage cases absent the rigors of class
certification; (4) allowing the use of expert state agencies whose interpretation of
statutes is given deference and whose testimony with regard to damages is less likely
to be excluded by the trial judge in comparison to testimony from a private expert;
and, ultimately, (5) increasing the likelihood of reaching a successful outcome, most
often through settlement.105 For these reasons, enterprising law firms have
aggressively pursued the avenue of working on a contract basis for state AGs, some
of them pitching potential cases to resource-constrained AGs and agreeing to do the
legal work on a contingency fee basis.106 They have also developed relationships
with AGs in the context of False Claims Act cases where they have an interest in
encouraging the state AG to intervene. The overall result is an opportunity for AGs
to leverage private law firm resources and for private law firms to leverage
government access to the courts.

105

See, e.g., Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits, supra note 11, at 142–43
(discussing the legal advantages gained by private plaintiffs’ lawyers in working with states
and pursuing state lawsuits).
106
See, e.g., Peter Roff, Opinion, Attorneys General Shouldn’t Outsource Legal Work
to Private Firms, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
attorneys-general-shouldnt-outsource-legal-work-to-private-firms [https://perma.cc/FD7UYUY4] (providing examples of law firms aggressively pitching cases to cash-strapped AGs
and performing the resulting legal work on a contingency fee basis).
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The ability to leverage private legal R&D does not remove the need for public
legal R&D. A law firm’s R&D will be focused on opportunities for profitable
recovery based on monetary damages and may leave out important areas of public
legal interest. While not a substitute for public legal R&D, however, private legal
R&D can act as an important supplement to what is often limited public capacity to
invest in litigation.
III. DIVERGENCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN LITIGATION
Litigation can be an important tool for addressing misconduct that harms public
health.107 At its best, litigation can result in prophylactic measures or make-whole
remedies, it can surface information that informs public opinion and enlightens
consumers, it can inform regulators and legislators and drive regulation or law, and
it can promote legislative and regulatory oversight to ensure more diligent
compliance. Legislative response to litigation can come in the form of corrective
action when the legislator deems that the courts were in error,108 or where the courts
were constrained by existing law.109 At other times, litigation can uncover public
information that drives legislators to provide a new statutory basis for the relief
sought in court.110 Complaints, answers, motions, and discovery create, organize,
and interpret valuable information that can be analyzed and used by the press,
legislators, regulators, and those enforcing compliance of existing regulatory and
statutory obligations. Since small corporate derelictions are often symptomatic of
more pervasive and significant problems, even cases involving seemingly lesser or
107

See, e.g., Guttman, infra note 110.
See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, EEOC
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/equal-pay-act-1963-and-lilly-ledbetter-fair-pay-act2009 (reacting to the Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550
US 618 (2007)).
109
A good example is Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. Pena,
62 F. Supp. 2d. 10 (D.D.C. 1999) where the court was constrained by CERCLA Section
113(h) from ordering an Environmental Impact Statement covering the recycling and
distribution into commerce of radioactive nickel from the K25 gaseous diffusion plant at the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In issuing an opinion dismissing the case, the court took the
opportunity to bring to the public’s attention the dangers of the proposed project. The court
noted: “[I]t is nevertheless startling and worrisome that from that early point on, there has
been no opportunity at all for public scrutiny or input on a matter of such grave importance.
The lack of public scrutiny is only compounded by the fact that the recycling process which
BNFL intends to use is entirely experimental at this stage. The process has not been
implemented anywhere on the scale which this project involves. Plaintiffs allege, and the
Defendants have not disputed, that there is no data regarding the process’ efficacy or track
record with regard to safety . . . .” Id. at 12. Following the Court’s opinion, DOE Secretary
Richardson canceled the project.
110
See, e.g., Reuben A. Guttman and Kathryn D. Wagner, The Asbestos Model; Labor
and Citizens Groups and a Multi-Pronged Approach to Regulatory Change published as a
Chapter in Conflict Resolution and Public Policy, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY (Mirriam K. Mills ed. 1990).
108
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discrete claims can surface and organize important information.111 Although not a
replacement for measures that might prevent the harm before it occurs, in a world of
asymmetric information about wrongdoing and limited administrative agency
enforcement capacity, litigation can be a necessary catalyst for the development of
prophylactic measures that protect public health.112
Theoretically, public health litigation can be used to achieve public health
objectives, but whether it actually serves those objectives, in whole or in part, will
depend on the decisions that are made at key stages along the litigation pathway.
This Section explores potential areas of divergence of the private incentives and
constraints of both the AG and the private law firm from public health objectives at
key points in the litigation process that may result in suboptimal decisions and
outcomes from a public health perspective. Construed in a positive light, these key
points in the litigation are also areas of opportunity to use procedure to increase the
public health value of the results.
A. State AG Incentives & Constraints
State AGs have a broad range of powers to exercise. These powers include the
authority to issue formal opinions to state agencies and represent them in court,
propose legislation, act as public advocates, engage in the protection of consumers,
enforce state and federal law, and institute civil suits on behalf of the state.113 In an
ideal world, this gives state AGs a unique opportunity to select and pursue highimpact public health litigation in ways that lead to the most effective forms of public
health benefit. This might include publicizing a problem to create legislative change,
increasing industry compliance with existing regulations, or raising the standard of
care for future industry actors as part of litigation outcomes. However, in reality,
AGs are constrained in their actions by a mix of institutional constraints and private
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To offer a medical example, a case exposing off-label marketing of a specific drug
can shed light on how internal revenue goals may drive decisions that ultimately impact
patient treatment, and a case alleging billing violations stemming from the upcoding of
billing records may reveal a breakdown in compliance. These limited derelictions can be
symptomatic of pervasive and significant problems that have a broad impact on patient care.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil
Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote, JUSTICE (May 7, 2012), https://www.just
ice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigations-label-promo
tion-depakote [https://perma.cc/E424-EH3J]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GlaxoSmithKline to
Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety
Data, JUSTICE (July 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-pleadguilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report#:~:text=Global%20
health%20care%20giant%20GlaxoSmithKline,for%20alleged%20false%20price%20report
ing [https://perma.cc/5VNQ-G29Y].
112
See, e.g., Parmet & Daynard, supra note 1, at 437 (examining ways in which public
health litigation can be used to respond to public health harms).
113
See, e.g., What Attorneys General Do, supra note 20.
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interests. These constraints and interests may lead to litigation decisions that diverge
from what is in the long-term public interest.114
When deciding whether, when, and how to bring a lawsuit, AGs must navigate
institutional resource constraints such as limited funding, concern about future
budgets, and the need to allocate time and resources across various activities. The
offices of the state AGs vary in a variety of ways, including not just the political
affiliation of the AG and the composition of the office but also the size of their
budgets and statutory provisions that impact their relationships with private law
firms.115 To give some idea of size and budget differences, in 2013, the state AG of
Nebraska had one of the smallest offices, with a budget under $6,000,000 and a staff
of about 100 attorneys and support staff, while the state AG of California had one
of the largest offices, with a budget of $741,778,000 and over 1,100 attorneys.116
While California’s office may seem large, even this budget and number of lawyers
pales in comparison to the range and scope of enforcement needs occurring in a large
state like California.
In addition to resource constraints, AGs need to manage pressure, secure
cooperation, and respond to feedback from a variety of constituency groups. These
constituents include voters, members of the media, state governors, and client
agencies. All these groups have the ability to influence an AG’s agenda and may be
involved or impacted in any given area of potential litigation interest.
The relationship between AGs and state agencies is particularly important in
the context of developing strategies for health litigation. AGs often either represent
or initiate suits on behalf of state agencies. They rely on state agencies for their
domain-specific expertise as well as their knowledge about the systems and actors
involved and the public and private interests at stake in the litigation. Obtaining
agency cooperation lends legitimacy to the proceedings and may even be required
to make certain kinds of decisions in the litigation process.117 Getting the support of
an “expert” agency to testify about causation and damages can also supplant the role
of expensive outside experts who face the risk of exclusion by the judge under the
existing rules of evidence. The cooperation of state agencies may be hard to secure,
however, especially where the misconduct is the result of an agency failure and/or
when the parties committing the misconduct have well-established and friendly
relationships with the agencies.118
114

See, e.g., Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 3, at 486.
See, e.g., Attorney General Office Comparison, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/Attorney_General_office_comparison [https://perma.cc/8A7P-BTJN] (last visited July
10, 2021).
116
Id.
117
See, e.g., What Does a State AG Do, NAT’L. ASS’N OF ATTYS GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag/faq/what_does_an_attorney_general_do.php
[https://perma.cc/8A7P-BTJN] (last visited July 10, 2021).
118
See, e.g., The State of N.J. Dept. of Law and Pub. Safety, AG Grewal Challenges
Federal Refusals to Cooperate with State Investigations of Predatory Practices by Student
Loan Servicers and School, N.J. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases19/
pr20190917a.html [https://perma.cc/SQV8-26MY].
115
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While agencies play an important gatekeeping role (and in some cases a drag)
on AG litigation decisions, public pressures are also influential in determining AG
action.119 Indeed, in particularly prominent cases where misconduct has caused
massive public and publicized harm, public pressure may be one of the primary
factors driving AG action. Public pressures may take a variety of conflicting forms,
such as conflicting interests between consumers and state corporate actors in
litigating product liability or environmental harms from local manufacturing.
Additionally, lobby groups representing special interests may have a
disproportionate impact on AG decisions because of their ability to generate focused
attention on discrete issues, often with the implicit commitment to provide financial
support in the form of campaign contributions.120
There are also institutional reasons why state AGs may not be interested in
proactively looking for cases to bring. In contrast to private firms, AGs are not
tasked with the need to search for new litigation strategies to stay employed. They
invariably have more enforcement opportunities than they can pursue, even taking
the state of the law as given. Taking on high-risk litigation strategies that challenge
the status quo might come at the expense of pursuing known enforcement objectives,
a shift of resources that might be difficult to justify in the absence of a strong public
policy reason and/or grassroots pressure to pursue a particular area of corporate
wrongdoing. The relatively short duration of the average AG tenure also makes
pursuing cases with long-term horizons more difficult to motivate and sustain since
the AG may not be there to reap the benefits of the suits initiated. Thus, even those
state AGs that have the capacity and political support to pursue new areas of
corporate misconduct may find it difficult to pursue novel, complex litigation on
their own due to a lack of experience and resources.121
In addition to institutional constraints, the individuals who serve as AGs may
be motivated by private interests, such as bolstering their reputations, advancing
political ambitions, securing campaign support for reelection, and even securing
post-government employment in the private sector.122 The state AG position is often
119

See generally Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note 13 (examining the
motivations of state AGs to participate in multi-state lawsuits and showing the importance
of political objectives in explaining litigation choices).
120
See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-giftspursue-attorneys-general.html [https://perma.cc/PN4A-JMK6] [hereinafter Lipton,
Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General].
121
See, e.g., Brumleve, supra note 34 (examining trends and relationships in the office
of the state AGs).
122
See, e.g., Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 3, at 512, 517 (stating that
“Attorneys general may sometimes be motivated by more personal interests as well, such as
an interest in building their professional reputations or in pleasing powerful political
contributors or constituencies,” but recognizing that claims about “political” attorneys
general are often overstated). Note that AGs secure their positions in most states through
popular election (forty-three states and Washington D.C.); they are appointed by the
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regarded as a stepping stone for individuals with greater political ambitions,
providing an additional political agenda that may influence AG decision-making.123
For those not interested in pursuing political ambitions, there is also an active
revolving door in which many AGs move into desirable private-sector jobs upon
completing their term(s) as AGs.124
Where the AG is able and willing to hire private law firms to litigate state
interests, private law firm marketing efforts to secure government contracts may
further impact AG decision-making. This concern about corporate influence,
including private law firm influences on AGs, has been a focal point for critics of
public-private litigation.125 For example, some plaintiffs’ trial firms may make
campaign contributions to those state AGs who must run for office, as well as
promise financial support for AGs with future political ambitions.126 Potential
industry defendants may make campaign contributions for different reasons, such as
deterring rather than encouraging litigation.127 Where AGs have pre-existing
relationships with private lawyers, or where private lawyers are able to cultivate new
relationships through marketing efforts, these lawyers may have unfair access to
state litigation opportunities and can influence AG decision-making in various ways.
AG decision-making is thus subject to a myriad of pressures. These pressures
include political pressure to pursue (or not pursue) certain areas of activity,
reputational interests and opportunities for credit claiming, impact on the state AG’s
budget, institutional constraints arising from the need to satisfy multiple
constituencies, and trade-offs between alternative ways of spending time and
governor in five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming) and
four jurisdictions (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). In Maine,
they are elected by secret ballot of the legislature, and in Tennessee by the state supreme
court.
123
See, e.g., Provost, When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?, supra note 88, at 597.
124
See, e.g., Miranda Litwak & Molley Coleman, Biden Must Close the Revolving Door
Between BigLaw and Government, AM. PROSPECT
(Jan. 13, 2021),
https://prospect.org/cabinet-watch/biden-must-close-the-revolving-door-between-biglawand-government/ [https://perma.cc/Q3GD-Q5E3]; Dan Packel, Hire Up: The DC Revolving
Door Starts Turning, AM. LAW. (Dec. 4, 2020) https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020
/12/04/hire-up-the-dc-revolving-door-starts-turning/?slreturn=20210610150629 [https://per
ma.cc/Q3GD-Q5E3].
125
See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Courting Favor, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/inter
active/2015/us/politics/attorneys-general.html [https://perma.cc/VM9V-VJPE] (last visited,
July 15, 2021) [hereinafter Lipton, Courting Favor] (containing a series of articles examining
the “explosion in lobbying of state attorneys general by corporate interests, including an
active role by private law firms”); Editorial Board, Attorneys General for Sale, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/opinion/attorneys-general-forsale.html [https://perma.cc/Q3GD-Q5E3] (discussing the pervasive role of lobbying in
impacting AG decision-making and calls for reform).
126
See, e.g., Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays, supra note 5.
127
See, e.g., Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, supra note
120 (discussing the role of law firms in lobbying state AGs on behalf of industry clients
concerned about liability, including involvement of former AGs in the lobbying efforts).
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resources. In some cases, the time requirement of the case, and its likely resolution,
will also be a dominant consideration. The salience of a damage award is an easy
metric of success that can also address state budgetary pressures, and a litigation
success against a bad actor will often be regarded positively by the public and the
media. Usually, these institutional constraints and private interests will tend to push
in the direction of litigation that requires minimal outlay of AG resources and
promises a low-risk award of damages in cases that involve politically unpopular
wrongdoers.
B. Private Law Firm Incentives & Constraints
Even well-intentioned private plaintiffs’ lawyers are constrained by business
models inherent in the private practice of law. Law firms are businesses focused on
expected net profits. Aside from fixed law firm overhead, litigation costs are everincreasing, and those costs expand as a case progresses past the initial pleading stage
to include high-dollar expenditures for depositions, experts, document repositories,
and electronic discovery consultants, as well as the cost of travel where required.128
Moreover, time invested in one case is time that cannot be invested in other cases;
this means that case selection will ultimately depend on expected profitability and
the opportunity cost of the case in terms of other cases foregone.
Private law firm business models may also place some value on the reputational
benefits of association with a highly publicized case or one with public interest
precedent, although the reputational value of a case does not always correlate with
either the economic or public health value of the case. Generally, in high-impact
public health litigation, the private law firm works on a contingency fee basis, which
means that a firm that is doing its job well must invest a large amount of money
upfront based on the expectation of a financial recovery that makes the initial
investment attractive. This financial model makes issues of cost, timing, and
expected return important drivers of litigation decisions.
Profit-driven, time-sensitive incentives will shape key decisions along the
entire litigation pathway, starting with case selection and ending with the narrative,
settlement agreement, or press release confirming or reporting the resolution of a
case and the impact of that resolution. Law firms are often in the position of
financing and managing the litigation on behalf of multiple claimants, typically with
the hope of receiving a fee that will be much larger than the recovery of any of the
individual plaintiffs. In these cases, some commentators have argued that law firms
may face financial pressures and interests that diverge from those of the claimants,
creating additional opportunities for a divergence of litigation decisions from the

128

See, e.g., Paula Hannaford-Agar, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings
from a Survey of Trial Lawyers, 22 VOIRE DIRE (Spring 2013) (discussing the civil litigation
cost model and noting sources of and trends in costs).
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public interest.129 This is of particular concern in the context of MDLs, where there
are no written rules governing the obligations of lead counsel. In MDLs, much of
the conduct of these cases is guided by the development of norms created by a
relatively small group of lawyers. The result has been to disenfranchise many clients
from the daily operations of their litigation. 130
Many of the law firms that represent or seek to represent AGs are (or hope to
be) repeat players in public-private litigation. Plaintiffs’ law firms seeking to work
with AGs are constantly looking for new case ideas to market to state AGs.131 In
their search, they inevitably focus on cases that promise large expected profits,
which will be a function of the expected costs and duration of litigation, the
likelihood of settling, the amount that a case is likely to settle for, and the potential
damages that can be secured through litigation. They are also interested in cases that
offer the potential for joining additional states, which not only offers a greater return
but also provides litigation efficiencies as leverage. Cases that either use prior legal
R&D or provide the foundation for a future series of cases in the same area also offer
opportunities to benefit from litigation efficiencies and increase returns. The cases
most likely to advance the public interest will be those advancing new legal theories
in new contexts where there is significant unaddressed public harm. But these will
also be the cases that are the most costly and risky to bring and will only be
financially attractive to the private firms who can bring them if the potential recovery
is large enough.
In high-profile areas of litigation, where novel legal theories have already been
advanced in other contexts or states, the prospect of working with AGs can attract
law firms that bring little new R&D, but rather are interested in copying existing
cases and adapting them for the benefit of state and municipal actors who have not
yet engaged in suit. Often these are low-cost operations, with efforts to minimize
up-front costs in the hope of an easy settlement.132
Ultimately, in most, if not all, cases, the private law firm will be interested in
reaching a settlement that maximizes the monetary damages, a priority which may
come at the expense of other metrics such as the value of a public record, public
129

To the extent that this is an issue, the concern is more paramount regarding multidistrict litigation (MDLs) than class actions where the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
lays out very transparent processes for class notice, selection of counsel, and approval of
settlements.
130
See, e.g., Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 75, at 67.
131
See, Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, supra note 120
(“While prospecting for contacts, the private lawyers have also donated tens of thousands of
dollars to campaigns of individual attorneys general, as well as party-backed organizations
that they run.”); Matthew Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 112 (2013) (discussing
private plaintiff innovations and novel litigation strategy that government agencies might not
otherwise attempt).
132
See Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019
BYU L. REV. 421 (2020) (discussing of the “piggybacking” that occurs in multi-state
litigation).
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admissions of misconduct, and prophylactic remedies. While the law firm may well
be meeting the terms of its contract in doing so, such contracts invariably fail to
articulate all the necessary metrics.
C. Key Decision Points for Public Health Value
The combination of private law firms and state AGs, each with their own
institutional constraints and interests, may exacerbate the challenges of keeping the
litigation process focused on public goals. The private law firm focuses on the
opportunity for profitable litigation, with the certainty, speed, and amount of
damages as its metrics, and the AG focuses on a variety of political incentives and
institutional constraints that are tied to or impacted by similar metrics of risk, speed,
and money. The absence of good metrics to capture the non-monetary aspects of the
litigation adds to the problem of prioritizing health impact in decision-making.
In this Section, we identify key decision points in public health litigation where
the private incentives and constraints of both public and private lawyers may diverge
from the public interest, resulting in a loss of public health value from the litigation.
While reasonable people may disagree on how to define the “public health value” of
litigation, it should include at least the following fairly uncontroversial objectives:
(1) correcting the immediate problem by securing the necessary injunctive relief and
damages; (2) exposing the pervasive nature of the problem, including whether it was
a manifestation of flaws in governance, agency oversight, or the result of isolated
factors that created conflicts with safety or environmental obligations; and (3)
creating a transparent record for use by other constituency groups such as regulators,
legislators, the press, and healthcare professionals, including doctors and members
of the scientific community. Ideally, these factors will lead to a fourth source of
public health value, prompting structural changes to industry practices, agency
oversight, and consumer or medical community diligence, to avoid future harms.
These changes may take the form of court-ordered corrective action, case law
altering the standard of care, the identification of needed legislative change, and/or
other ways of producing or catalyzing structural change.133
The following are some of the key decision points in the litigation process that
can have a potentially significant impact on the public health value of the litigation.
1. Case Selection
AGs have four main sources of new cases: (1) the cases that originate from
within the AG’s office either as the result of a policy focus or in reaction to an
immediate or well-publicized health and safety concern; (2) False Claims Act cases
133
Measuring this fourth source of value is particularly challenging. See, e.g., Timothy
D. Lytton, Using Litigation to Make Public Health Policy: Theoretical and Empirical
Challenges in Assessing Product Liability, Tobacco, and Gun Litigation, 32 J.L., MED. &
ETHICS 556 (2004) (discussing some of the challenges in evaluating the impact of litigation
on health policy).
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filed by private law firms with the potential for the AG to intervene; (3) cases that
come from private law firms that pitch ideas to the AG; and (4) decisions to join in
collective action with other states that have initiated a case, often in partnership with
private counsel. Many AG offices do not have the capacity to engage in extensive
legal R&D, at least as a general practice, and instead focus largely on routine
enforcement of civil and criminal matters where the law and precedent are clear.
High-impact health litigation cases, or at least those requiring extensive resources
and legal R&D, are often cases that have either been initiated by a whistleblower
under the False Claims Act or cases that have been developed at least in part by
private law firms.134
Relationships with private counsel can take on at least two forms. In some
cases, the AG needs representation in particular areas, such as antitrust or
pharmaceutical fraud, and issues a request for proposals (RFP) for a panel of private
lawyers with subject matter expertise. In this case, the litigation area is selected by
the AG, although the selected panel will have an ongoing relationship with the AG
and be able to continually advise the AG on possible litigation opportunities.135 In
other cases, it is the private lawyer or law firm, or more often an intermediary that
has an established relationship with the AG, such as a former AG who now works
in private practice, who approaches the AG with a proposal for litigation.136 In the
latter case, the private law firm is more directly involved in case selection. Where it
is the private firm that proposes the case, expected profits, along with the fruits of
legal R&D that have been oriented towards finding profitable cases, will be primary
factors in case selection.
Regardless of whether the case emerges from within the AG’s office or is one
proposed by a private law firm, the AG makes the ultimate decision about whether
to bring the case. When state AGs are deciding on whether to bring a case, they don’t
just weigh the institutional costs against the expected public health value. Their case
selection will be influenced by factors such as the political costs and benefits, the
134

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Justice Department Recovers over $2.2 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020, JUSTICE (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year2020 [https://perma.cc/F8UG-BWAQ] (noting that out of $1.8 billion recovered from health
care fraud litigation in 2020, $1.6 billion came from suits filed by whistleblowers under the
qui tam provision of the False Claims Act).
135
The AG may flag the area in response to a proliferation of private sector litigation
when other AGs have embarked on similar litigation in the field alone or with private
counsel. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 created rules for
establishing lead plaintiffs—and thus lead counsel—in securities class actions by giving
preference to entities that had lost the most money. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(a), 109 Stat.
737, 737–39 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). This created a role for state pension fund
lawyers, which were initially recruited by plaintiff securities firms to monitor their holdings
and bring suits. Once these suits became the norm with recoveries returning at least some
losses to the funds, AGs and (where applicable) State Treasurers began the practice of
selecting panels of securities firms to bring such cases.
136
See, e.g., Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays, supra note 5.
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amount of money that can be recovered for the state as a way of showing that they
are funding their own budget, and the likelihood and magnitude of reputational gain,
which may encompass accolades from the press, voters, colleagues, and institutions
with stakes in the game.137 They may also worry about the potentially negative
reactions of pursuing a case, particularly from the industries that will be directly or
indirectly impacted.138 Decisions not to bring a case may be equally or sometimes
even more important than decisions to pursue a case.
If a state AG is simply responding to case ideas provided by private counsel or
deciding whether to intervene in a case, the immediate factors that the AG is likely
to consider may not be all that different from their private law counterparts. The
dominant factors in these situations will be the likelihood of success and the impact
of a loss on prospective enforcement efforts, expected damages, whether the AG has
the ability to monitor the litigation and secure agency support, and confidence in the
abilities of private counsel that has suggested the idea and/or will conduct the
litigation. Instead of making decisions about which cases to bring based on a costbenefit analysis of how best to use scarce state resources to achieve public health
value (taking into account opportunities to leverage private legal R&D), case
selection can often be more a matter of AG selection among the opportunities
engineered by private law firms, with an eye to the risks inherent in the case, the
credibility of the lawyers, and the expected monetary returns.
Two important aspects of case selection are the absence of a formal process for
justifying decisions not to bring a case where there is public health merit and a lack
of any formal procedure for bringing relevant stakeholders to the table when making
the decision to pursue or reject such a case. While AGs may discuss a litigation
proposal with an expert agency or an agency that has sustained injury, such as a
health and welfare fund, AGs do not, as a routine matter, have a standing panel of
specialized experts on medicine, the environment, or product safety.139 Perhaps as a
137
See, e.g., Erichson, Coattail Class Actions, supra note 70 (discussing the differences
in incentives between public and private lawyers); Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note
13, at 6–97 (describing a confluence of factors that may influence state AGs to pursue or
avoid litigation, including political ambitions, public support, policy direction, and economic
impact).
138
For example, industry groups may fund electoral challenges to sitting AGs. To be
clear, just as plaintiffs’ lawyers may be developing relationships with AGs, industry groups
also attempt to form relationships and can provide campaign support for the incumbent or
the opposition. See, e.g., Lipton, Courting Favor, supra note 125 (listing a series of articles
examining the “explosion in lobbying of state attorneys general by corporate interests,
including an active role by private law firms”).
139
Of course, those who participate in such a panel would have to be cleared of conflicts
of interest. Since the Lewis Powell Memo of August 23, 1971, to Eugene B. Sydnor,
Chairman, Education Committee, US Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber and its members
have made inroads into establishing allies on university campuses through funded research,
grants, and support of student organizations. See, e.g., Adam Eichen, After 48 Years,
Democrats Still Haven’t Gotten the Memo, NEW REPUBLIC (July 23, 2019), https://newrep
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consequence, it can take years to fully appreciate and react to sources of public
health harm, as was the case in the opioid litigation, where knowledge of the harms
preceded decisions to litigate by decades.140
2. The Relationship with Private Counsel
Where the AG works with private counsel, some of the key litigation decisions
will be made by the private lawyers running the day-to-day litigation, while other
decisions will reflect dialogue between the law firm(s) and attorneys from the AG’s
office. A few of the most salient decisions, such as the decision to settle, will reflect
the state AG’s own individual and institutional incentives and constraints, but even
then, private law firm interests are likely to play a pivotal role. The nature and
structure of the relationship with private counsel is thus an important aspect of the
litigation process.
For False Claims Act cases, the relationship is statutory, and the nature of the
collaboration beyond that is left to the parties.141 In contrast, where private law firms
are hired by the state to bring suit, the “partnership” will flow from a contracting
process that varies by state.142 In some cases, the state AG is required to engage in a
bidding process; in other cases, the state AG can contract directly with the law
firm(s) that propose a case.143 Just as with any other kind of client development,
private plaintiffs’ firms will invest funds in developing relationships with state AGs.
In some cases, this might even involve making campaign contributions where the
state AG is an elected position.144 Some AGs will have ongoing relationships with
ublic.com/article/154518/democrats-powell-memo-election-strategy [https://perma.cc/CQD
4-2R62] (discussing the successful efforts of a network of billionaires working together “to
create an apparatus to shift politics rightward in much the way Powell outlined”).
140
Examples of delay include the settlement with the tobacco industry, where
knowledge of harm and failed litigation went on for decades prior to AGs leveraging their
cumulative litigation power, and the opioid litigation, which occurred long after initial cases
detailing harm. See generally Andrei Sirabionian, Comment, Why Tobacco Litigation Has
Not Been Successful in the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Tobacco Litigation
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 485 (2005); Derek
Carr, Corey S. Davis & Lainie Rutkow, Reducing Harm Through Litigation Against Opioid
Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 207 (2018).
141
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730–33.
142
See generally Government Contracts with Private Lawyers, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE
COUNCIL, https://www.statelawsuitreform.com/factor_category/government-agency-hirings
-of-private-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/JWP8-8TH3] (last visited July 10, 2021).
143
See, e.g., Douglas F. McMeyer, Lise T. Spacapan & Robert W. George, Contingency
Fee Plaintiffs’ Counsel and the Public Good?, HUSCH BLACKWELL (2011), http://www.then
alfa.org/files/Husch_Blackwell_Report_on_Contingency_Fee_Lawyers.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Q7UF-HVTV] (providing a critique of alternative contracting practices by states based
on survey of AGs and their contracting practices with private contingency fee lawyers).
144
See, e.g., John O’Brien, S.C. AG McMaster Taking Contributions from Outside
Counsel He Hired, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Sept. 24, 2009), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/51

1210

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

private law firms, while others will rely on competitive bidding to satisfy their legal
outsourcing needs. Ultimately, the relationship between AGs and private counsel
will be governed by a mix of statutory requirements and contracts, along with
relational norms and practices and the influence of pre-existing personal
relationships that together will influence which private law firms are involved and
how litigation decisions are made.
While in the case of procurement, the contracting process could offer an
opportunity to structure the litigation process in ways that narrow the divergence of
public and private incentives, in practice, many contracts focus primarily on the
structure of the fees. The contracts will generally specify that AGs will retain control
over key litigation decisions, such as decisions to settle, but often will control little
beyond that. Without clear guidelines regarding how information will be shared and
how joint decisions will be made, much of the litigation process will end up being
run, at least on a day-to-day basis, by the private law firms. Without attention to the
right metrics and benchmarks in the contracts, the incentives of the private firm will
be skewed towards decisions that increase profits, whether through reducing
litigation costs or increasing returns, and control over the day-to-day aspects of the
litigation will remain with the private firm with little oversight.
There is an additional set of challenges arising from limitations on quality
control in the selection of private law firms and limitations in the ability to monitor
private decisions to ensure they take public health interests into account.
3. Deciding Whether to Bring in Other AGs
A key decision point in potentially high-impact litigation is whether to pursue
the case alone or in conjunction with other AGs, many of whom may have their own
private counsel relationships. In determining whether to engage in interstate
partnerships, questions will arise about the allocation of work, with results that can
have a significant impact on the outcome of the litigation. Collective action by
multiple state AGs often leads to a division of investigation tasks among those AGs.
Document review, for example, often involving millions of electronic records, is
typically divided among AG offices. Where this division of task and review of
discovery occurs, no single office may see the big picture of the case, and each office
may similarly be hampered in the ability to use document search commands to look
for the fragments of evidence necessary to support or test legal theories. This leads
to problems of both fragmentation and accountability. With big legal teams, no
single lawyer may grasp the entire scheme of wrongdoing or feel personal
responsibility for the outcome. Where multiple law firms are involved in collective
actions brought by AGs, there is the added problem that firms competing against
each other for fees will expand their legal teams to claim a greater portion of the
attorney’s fees. This, in turn, will increase the fragmentation of the case, with no
single lawyer being in complete command of the facts. Since much of the public
0521545-s-c-ag-mcmaster-taking-contributions-from-outsidecounsel-he-hired [https://perm
a.cc/UVV9-K4D4].

2021]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE LITIGATION FOR HEALTH

1211

health value of litigation lies in how discovery is conducted and how the record is
constructed and developed, de-centralization of the pre-trial litigation process can
significantly harm public health value.145
4. Drafting the Complaint
The complaint is the introductory pleading that not only triggers the lawsuit but
also serves as the important framing narrative for the case. It lays out facts, legal
theories, and themes. If the notice pleading standard initially established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson146
excused plaintiff’s counsel from lengthy factual recitations, the subsequent court
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal not only opened the door to lengthy fact-intensive
pleadings but also effectively mandated it.147 As a result, complaints in complex
cases can easily exceed a hundred pages.
Drafting the complaint will involve critical decisions about the scope and
breadth of the case, such as the causes of action, the parties to include, and the nature
of the remedies to seek. Particularly where the judge is the gatekeeper for
determining the “plausibility” of the action, the drafters of the complaint must
include “context” which may make the action more or less plausible. “Context” may
include prior bad acts by the defendant in order to show “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”148
The complaints in cases of public interest often become more than just
pleadings, also serving as de facto white papers to educate policymakers and other
stakeholders. They provide relevant members of the community with information,
and, particularly in an age of social media, they may prompt witnesses to come
forward with supporting evidence. In addition to functioning as a white paper, the
complaint serves as an opportunity to create a public record of actions that have
created public health harm. In situations where the case is settled quickly after the
complaint is filed, it is often the only public record. This record can serve as a
catalyst for government regulatory oversight, oversight by private bodies given
regulatory authority, and oversight and further investigation by the press.
While the complaint can and does serve all these functions, the drafters of the
complaint may not be crafting it with the public value of these functions in mind.
For the private lawyer, the private interests in speed, limiting risk, and maximizing
expected recovery may push in one of two directions. There may be pressure to
construe the claims in a way that is tied most closely to an easily identified and
palatable (to the defendant) claim for monetary damages. Or there may be an interest
145

The litigation process—particularly discovery—is designed to create transparency
sufficient for parties to evaluate their risks in front of a jury. Once the parties can calculate
their risks and the range of results, they often settle. Hence the pre-trial process has become
the real core of the litigation. See generally J.C. LORE & REUBEN GUTTMAN, PRETRIAL
LITIGATION (Wolters Kluwer forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).
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355 U.S. 41, 45–48 (1957).
147
See supra Section I.C.1. for a discussion of the implications of Twombly and Iqbal.
148
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
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in limiting the number of stakeholders involved in planning the case, given the added
time, cost, and potential for differences of opinion that come with including
additional decision-makers, such as members of relevant agencies, in the litigation
discussions. The result of limiting the scope of the claims and the involvement of
potentially relevant stakeholders will be a failure to formulate claims that capture
the full reach of the misconduct and the full scope of potential remedies.
In some cases, rather than seeking the claims most likely to lead to a quick
settlement, the private law firm may see potential for a large but risky recovery
through a creative application of the law that pushes the limits of existing legal
theories and precedent. Private law firms looking for new opportunities will often
invest in legal R&D to develop such boundary-pushing claims. It is permissible
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to assert nonfrivolous claims that extend,
modify, or even establish new law.149 Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis provides
an avenue to reach back into the common law to find theories that address new or
evolving factual paradigms. A good illustration of this is the pursuit of the opioid
industry using a theory of nuisance developed by the Oklahoma AG working with
private counsel.150 Yet state AGs charged with enforcing the law will rightfully be
concerned with bringing claims that reflect a reliable reading of the current state of
the law. The complaint needs to protect this legitimacy value by making it clear why
the suit has been brought and why it involves a violation of the law. The partnership
of private law firms and state AGs may involve a push and pull between these
tendencies to push boundaries and to give a reliable reading to existing law. In some
cases, it can lead to a murky threshold for determining which legal theories to
advance, unless these different interests are openly acknowledged and the public
interests in legitimacy protected.
5. Pre-Trial Litigation Decisions and the Public Record
Decisions made during the pre-trial litigation process will often determine not
only the outcome of the case but also the nature and scope of the record that is
created and made available to the public.151 For cases decided on motions to dismiss
or motions for summary judgment, the motions papers, along with the exhibits and
affidavits they incorporate, might be the only public documents summarizing
important facts and issues of the case. The added value of the documents as
providing a public record of wrongdoing may be neglected by the litigants where
the focus is simply on winning the motion.
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FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
See, e.g., Judgment of Aug. 26, 2019, after Non-Jury Trial at 1–2, 22–23, Oklahoma
ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2017). See
also Nancy Henderson, Righting Wrongs, OKLAHOMA SUPER LAWYERS MAGAZINE (Nov.
2019), https://www.superlawyers.com/oklahoma/article/righting-wrongs/be1e3c9e-5534430b-81de-4c76d12c0350.html [https://perma.cc/L7FW-RKE6].
151
For a broad discussion on the importance of the pre-trial process, see generally LORE
& GUTTMAN, supra note 145.
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Where the case proceeds beyond initial efforts to dismiss and discovery begins,
decisions about the scope and confidentiality of the discovery process will be critical
in obtaining and determining whether to share private information that can be
essential in detecting patterns of wrongdoing and sources of harm.
Three trends in pre-trial litigation create risks for the public record that private
law firms and AGs may be disinclined to address: (1) the shift towards MDLs that
consolidates claims for pre-trial purposes; (2) an increase in multi-state suits and a
resulting fragmentation of the knowledge acquisition; and (3) a shift to blanket
confidentiality agreements and a willingness to approve a broad range of nondisclosure agreements.
The first trend of concern is the shift towards the use of MDLs to consolidate
cases for pre-trial purposes.152 The ways in which MDLs consolidate cases and the
ways in which decision-making is organized leave little room for considering the
public interest value of the record being generated. Rather, the interests of the repeat
players in MDL litigation, particularly those most frequently appointed as lead
counsel, predominate in setting the norms and rules for the proceedings in ways that
often disadvantage the interests of the plaintiffs.153
The second trend is for AGs and their private counsel to contract with additional
AGs and, if they have any, their counsel to bring multi-state lawsuits.154 The
expansion of the group of claimants can lead to a fragmentation of the work—and,
therefore, knowledge acquisition—involved in pre-trial discovery. It can also lead
to a lack of investment in the pre-trial documents being generated by reducing
individual accountability in the quality of the documents and diluting the individual
benefits from investing time in legal R&D.
The third trend, one that is particularly concerning, is the growing use of
blanket protective orders that allow defendants to keep the information acquired
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See generally BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 77 (exploring trends towards
greater use of MDLs in mass tort litigation and the ways in which MDLs, as they operate in
practice, undermine plaintiffs’ rights).
153
See, e.g., Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 75, at 67
(exploring how repeat players in MDLs exert control over the proceedings and establish
norms and practices that undermine the interests of the plaintiffs).
154
See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, The Story Behind the Prominent Rise of State AGs,
GOVERNING (May 20, 2015), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-attorneys-generallawsuits-policymaking.html [https://perma.cc/3J25-6V99] (discussing how AGs have
banded together to bring multi-state suits over the past few decades); PAUL NOLETTE,
FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015) (exploring the rise in multi-state actions by AGs and their
role as “de facto policymakers”); Theresa Defino, Healthcare Compliance Association, New
Enforcement Threat: “Coordinated” AGs Pursuing Settlements Involving Big Breaches,
(Health Care Compliance Ass’n, Report on Patient Privacy 20, no. 12), JDSUPRA (Dec. 18,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-enforcement-threat-coordinated-ags63353/ [https://perma.cc/9DZH-Y9C6] (discussing how the success of recent multi-state
suits relating to data breaches under HIPPA have motivated the AG community to continue
to pursue similar multi-state settlements).
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during the pre-trial process away from the public.155 This problem is compounded
by the willingness of the plaintiffs, including public plaintiffs like the AGs, to agree
to such orders. Even some judges have become inclined to permit blanket
confidentiality orders, as illustrated by the wide confidentiality provided in the
opioid MDL.156
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 encourages the parties to negotiate standard
confidentiality agreements that will govern the litigation.157 The notion of
confidentiality is designed to facilitate the sharing of documents with restrictions to
accommodate matters including patient privacy and trade secrets. Yet, most
confidentiality agreements provide defendants with a latitude to mark virtually all
documents as confidential, meaning that they can only be seen by the parties.158
Some confidentiality agreements go so far as to restrict the production of documents,
even those that are not confidential, to use only in litigation. This means the
documents cannot be shared with litigants in other cases, the news media, or even
regulators.159 As a practical matter, this creates inefficiencies in litigation because
such orders preclude similarly injured plaintiffs from investigating their claims or
making their litigation more efficient by using discovery from another proceeding.160
It also limits opportunities for synergies between the judicial and legislative
155
See, e.g., Lori E. Andrus, Fighting Protective and Secrecy Orders, PLAINTIFF
MAGAZINE (Aug. 2014), https://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/recent-issues/item/fightingprotective-and-secrecy-orders-2 [https://perma.cc/2KSH-524P]; Susan Burgess, The Chill of
Blanket Orders, REPORTERS COMMITTEE (2006), https://www.rcfp.org/journals/the-newsmedia-and-the-law-summer-2006/chill-blanket-orders/ [https://perma.cc/PZ6D-WK38].
156
See, e.g., Jennifer D. Oliva, Opioid Multidistrict Litigation Secrecy, 80 OHIO ST. L.J.
663, 664–65 (2019) (examining how non-disclosure rulings of judges in the opioid MDL
negatively impact public health outcomes and are part of a broader trend towards secrecy in
MDL proceedings of this kind).
157
Note that there may also be restrictions on access to documents based on attorneyclient privilege and the work-product doctrine, but these are dealt with separately—the
documents are not produced but placed on a log presented to the opposing party.
158
See, e.g., COLLABORATION RSCH. INTEGRITY & TRANSPARENCY, YALE,
PREVENTING THE USE OF COURTS TO SHIELD ESSENTIAL HEALTH INFORMATION:
RETHINKING CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDICAL PRODUCT LITIGATION 6–11, 13–20, (2018),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/crit/crit_report.final_.pdf [https://perma.
cc/N9AB-M9U2] (exploring the trend of increasing confidentiality of information relevant
to medical products litigation and proposing best practices for disclosure). For an example
of the harms of an expansive approach, see Oliva, supra note 156.
159
Ironically, the restriction on document reviews conflicts with FRCP 1, which
encourages the parties to negotiate efficiencies in the litigation. Courts have long held that
the sharing of non-confidential documents among litigants in different cases makes litigation
efficient. Indeed, an older version of FRCP provided that the discovery materials were
deemed filed in court. When that language was eliminated from FRCP 5, many defendants
seized on the opportunity to press for confidentiality agreements restricting the use of even
non-confidential information.
160
This is inconsistent with the intent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which states
that the rules should be employed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.
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branches of government.161 Lawsuits often rely on information generated during
legislative oversight hearings, and legislative oversight is often the product of
information generated in litigation.162
Private counsel working on contingency have an interest in getting from the
filing of a complaint to the resolution of the case as expeditiously as possible. They
are reluctant to take on the battles, at the onset of a case, over the scope of the
confidentiality agreement, because it will sidetrack the litigation and delay the
resolution of the case. AGs are also interested in reaching a settlement in order to
reduce litigation risk and obtain a damage award that provides the state with funds
and the public with an easy metric of success. The value of the public record is harder
to measure and the benefits more diffuse, and it thus fails to receive the protection it
deserves.163
6. Remedies
There are at least two different ways in which the current public-private
litigation approach to remedies limits the public health value of the litigation. The
first limitation arises from one of the major weaknesses in the litigation process: the
limited attention and resources devoted to damage modeling, particularly where the
public health harm is systemic and difficult to isolate. The inadequacy of the damage
models reflects at least in part an underinvestment in the tools and information
needed to build good systems of data collection and measurement. For the AG, cases
should not be seen in isolation but rather as part of an enforcement system. Investing
in systems of collecting and organizing data about state expenditures and the cost of
harms incurred, such as the state costs of different products or healthcare costs, will
increase the likelihood that public health harms will be detected and measured.
Investing in different tools for measuring and modeling different types of harm may
not be worthwhile for an individual case but doing so becomes worthwhile when the
benefits are spread over multiple cases. Private firms will not have this systemic
approach to damage modeling but rather will be focused on how much they can earn
in fees from a particular case or series of related cases. Moreover, they will not have

161
For an interesting discussion of discovery as regulation, including the role of
discovery in creating a robust public record, see, for example, Diego A. Zambrano,
Discovery as Regulation, 119 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2020).
162
For a discussion of the synergy between litigation and other regulatory strategies,
see, for example, Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health
Through Litigation: Lessons from Tobacco and Opiods, 73 STAN. L. REV. 285 (2021).
163
See, e.g., Oliva, supra note 156, at 683–98 (discussing the importance of litigation
in producing a public record of harm and the public health value lost by broad protective
orders in cases such as the multi-district opioid litigation); A. Lahav and E. Burch,
Information for the Common Good in Mass Torts, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3703814
[https://perma.cc/955RKJ2K] (discussing the powerful role of litigation in creating a public record of health and
safety harms).
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the institutional knowledge or authority to find ways of changing data gathering and
access practices.
The second problem with the way in which remedies are approached is the
emphasis on damages at the expense of other types of remedies. Typically, private
lawyers are retained on a percentage-of-the-recovery basis, and their focus is on
expected profit—a function of cost, speed, and total monetary damages/settlement
amount. But much of the potential public health value of the litigation may come in
the form of prophylactic relief, which is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
monetize.164 Securing non-monetary remedies is challenging since often the most
effective measures will involve costly, maybe even prohibitively expensive, changes
to the actions and behavior of defendants. What should the remedy be when the
business model of the defendant depends on the behavior that is the source of public
harm, for example, as in the case of tobacco? Or where the effects of the misconduct
outweigh the benefits of the activity, but the effects are diffuse and hard to measure
while the benefits are concentrated and easy to identify, like in the case of so many
chemical manufacturers?
There is one further area of divergence between the interests of private law
firms and the public interest. The private firm’s interest in a case is largely focused
on the monetary settlement or damages that it might yield. But there is a tremendous
future public value in deploying the lessons that can be learned from an existing
case. The AG has a continued obligation to address the set of case-specific problems
that a current case unmasks, and this will form part of the negotiation over damages
or settlement. But the AG also has an opportunity to make the healthcare system
better by employing lessons learned from the case, whether by educating relevant
agencies on areas where wrongdoing is likely to occur, by changing procurement
practices, addressing regulatory loopholes or weaknesses, or even by changing the
ways in which payments are made and information is stored. These future-looking
roles of litigation will often be neglected when discussing the remedies in any
particular case.
7. Settlement Decisions
Most high-impact cases brought by AGs settle, as do the vast majority of all
civil cases.165 Both AGs and private lawyers have an interest in settlement. Both
parties risk loss if they decide not to settle. To the state AG, loss may impact their
political position and their leverage to enforce the law. To private attorneys, loss
164

Consider, for example, a situation where a drug company markets a two billiondollar-a-year anti-psychotic with about $1.5 billion of the revenue stream being off-label.
The defendant is willing to settle the case for $1 billion but does not want to agree to a reeducation campaign that will teach the market about the proper use of the drug. The problem
is that the re-education campaign may be more valuable than the $1 billion settlement. See,
e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 101 (2004) (explaining generally
the need for prophylactic remedy when monetary remedies fall short).
165
See, e.g., LORE & GUTTMAN, supra note 145.
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may impact their reputation and expected profits. When a case is contracted out, the
risk of litigation shifts to the private firm. The firm must balance that risk against
the potential for recovery, which is measured by a contingent percentage of the
recovery. Unless there is clear guidance on damage modeling, the notion of
“litigation risk discount” is used by private counsel to support their decision to settle
when the resolution meets the following criteria: (1) the settlement amount they will
get exceeds the expected returns from pursuing the case further; (2) the potential for
a higher return by pursuing the litigation further does not override the risk of
continuing; and (3) the settlement recovery is sufficient to be perceived as a
success.166 The AG will face similar pressures, except perhaps in limited situations
where the AG may have a special interest in taking a case to trial, beyond the hope
of just winning. AGs may, for example, be willing to risk loss if they believe that
the loss will serve as a catalyst for legislative action and if they have a vested interest
in securing that action.
Settlement may lead to several lost opportunities to gain public health value
from the litigation. First, the value of pre-trial litigation, which includes the value of
the public record created and the “whitepapers” that motion documents can serve as,
is not considered in private settlement decisions and is likely not adequately
considered by the AG. Settling a case early will limit the information that makes it
onto the public record, and settling a case at any point may result in decisions to
keep aspects of the case private where they would have been made public in a court
decision.
Second, the settlement amount often fails to convey any useful information
about the nature of the harm or the patterns of misconduct, or to provide legitimacy
for the settlement decision. Both functions of the settlement amount in the case are
important. Where damage experts are used, their “method” should be transparent
and available for the public, including the press, to review and understand. If, for
example, a statistical model is used to project the impact of the alleged misconduct,
that model should be made a matter of public record. Unless models are made public,
the public, regulators, and legislators will not know if the settlement is reasonable.
Where the settlement amount is discounted to reflect the uncertainty of who will
win, this too should be transparent. Where lawyers decide that a settlement should
account for litigation risk, there must be some method or guidance to ascertain that
risk.
Third, settlement may allow the litigation to become akin to a parking ticket by
failing to be either large enough or transparent enough to reveal and deter the
underlying misconduct. The absence of rules that require certain findings to be made
public leads to a diminished value of settlements.
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See, e.g., Heather D. Heavin & Michaela Keet, Litigation Risk Analysis: Using
Rigorous Projections to Encourage and Inform Settlement, J. OF ARB. AND MEDIATION
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3148676 [https://perm
a.cc/YSN5-68VV].
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In sum, decisions that are made at key stages along the litigation pathway can
have an important impact on the ultimate public health value of the litigation, but
they are often made without this impact in mind.
This Section has illustrated some of the ways in which the divergence of the
private incentives and constraints of both the AG and the private law firm from
public health objectives at key points in the litigation process may result in
suboptimal outcomes from a public health perspective. The next Part suggests ways
in which changes in the procedure for pursuing this type of litigation might be used
to increase the realization of public health value from public-private health litigation.
IV. A PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT APPROACH TO THE LITIGATION PROCESS
In the prior Section, we identified how a divergence of private incentives from
public interests may influence decisions made along the litigation trajectory in ways
that limit the public health value of health litigation. In this final part, we propose a
decision-making framework that AGs can adopt to increase the role of public health
objectives in the litigation process. Drawing insights from approaches that have
succeeded in improving health and safety in other regulatory areas, we propose the
adoption of an impact analysis approach to guide the litigation process and its
results.167 While the analogies to impact assessments and impact statements used in
other types of agency decision-making are limited, given the different nature of
agency decision-making outside of a litigation framework, we draw useful ideas
from these other systems to develop a decision process and set of guidelines suited
to the AG—particularly the AG working with private counsel in a public litigation
context.
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The idea of integrating an assessment of impact into policymaking has been explored
in other contexts, such as integrating human rights and attention to equity into policy
decisions. See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan M. Mann, Towards the Development of a
Human Rights Impact Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health
Policies, 1 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS 59 (1994); Alan Jenkins, Juhu Thukral, Kevin Hsu,
Nerissa Kunakemakorn & Megan Haberle, Promoting Opportunity Through Impact
Statements: A Tool for Policymakers to Assess Equity, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y
(2012),
https://www.opportunityagenda.org/explore/resources-publications/promotingopportunity-through-impact-statements [https://perma.cc/X7GD-MX5R]. Concepts of
public health impact assessment are well established in public health. See, e.g., Karen Lock,
Health Impact Assessment, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 1395 (2000). There are even impact
assessment toolkits available for fashioning tailored impact assessments. See, e.g., Impact
Assessment Toolkit, DEPT. FOR BUS. INNOVATION AND SKILLS (2011),
https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/3642/file/UK_Impact%20Assessment%20Too
lkit_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJV8-45VC]. But we are not aware of any impact-based
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A. An Impact-Based Approach to the Litigation Process
Impact assessments and reports have been used in administrative decisionmaking as a way of forcing decision-makers to pay attention to, and make
transparent, the impact of their decisions on areas that have been identified as policy
priorities. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), for example,
declares environmental quality to be a national priority that should be explicitly
taken into account when federal agencies take any major action that might have an
environmental impact.168 The mechanism that they use to ensure that the
environment is considered when federal agencies shape their policies is a
requirement imposed on federal agencies to include an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) in all recommendations for “major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”169 This requires, at the very least,
that agencies make a full disclosure of the environmental impact that their proposed
regulation is likely to have. At a state level, impact assessments have also been
required when passing state criminal laws.170 Several states have been contemplating
legislation requiring consideration of health effects when making decisions on state
plans, projects, or policies, with some even going so far as to consider mandating
health impact statements before new regulations are introduced.171
While these kinds of impact analyses focus on assessing the likely impact of a
proposed change in law or regulation, impact reports have also been used to
summarize the results of industry investigations and provide recommendations for
future changes in standards of care. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), which
was modeled on the National Transportation Safety Board reporting scheme,
provides a good illustration of this model. The CSB was created under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 as an independent, non-regulatory federal agency tasked
with investigating the causes of major chemical incidents.172 Their stated mission is
to “drive chemical safety change through independent investigations to protect
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(2019).

See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, ch. 55, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)
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See, e.g., id.; Mary Anne Sullivan, Four Years of Environmental Impact Statements:
A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REV. 545 (1975).
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Some states require racial impact statements when proposing criminal laws that
show how the proposed law might have consequences with a disparate impact on minorities,
requiring that this information be shared before legislators vote on the law. See, e.g., Maggie
Clark, Should More States Require Racial Impact Statements for New Laws?, PEW TR. BLOG
(July 30, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/
07/30/should-more-states-require-racial-impact-statements-for-new-laws [https://perma.cc/
5YQ3-9VG4].
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See, e.g., Health Impact Assessment Legislation in the States, HEALTH IMPACT
PROJECT (Feb. 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/01/hia_and_legislat
ion_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7P5-UHS5].
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U.S. CHEM. SAFETY BD., https://www.csb.gov/ [https://perma.cc/37YS-8FVU] (last
visited July 8, 2021).
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people and the environment.”173 Each investigation is disclosed to the public,
updates are provided, and, at the conclusion of the investigation, a public report is
made available that documents the factors contributing to the harm and provides
recommendations on future changes to industry standards designed to avoid that
harm.174 The reports are collected in a publicly available and searchable database.175
These types of impact statements may—as in the case of an EIS—trigger some
level of accountability under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at the federal
level or state law equivalents of the APA at the state level.176 While these reporting
mechanisms provide useful models for transparent decision-making, it is not our
intent to create new causes of action against those that engage in civil prosecutorial
decision-making. Instead, we borrow the idea of impact assessments as a way of
guiding key decisions during the litigation process, creating internal accountability
for the decisions that are made, and promoting public accounting, guidance, and
transparency only once the litigation is finished.
We suggest that adopting a form of internal impact assessment to guide key
decisions during the litigation process and requiring a public impact report at the
end—whether this be upon the decision not to pursue a case, the settlement of the
case, or the conclusion of litigation—could be used to incorporate best practices into
litigation decisions and make transparent the reasoning and consequences of the
decisions that are made. An internal impact analysis would be initiated at the point
of case selection and then again added to certain critical points of the litigation that
have material effects on the likely outcome and are subject to a divergence of private
incentives from public health outcomes. A public impact report would be required
at the conclusion of any case that has resulted in at least the filing of a complaint.
Thus, from the moment of case selection, the AG should set in motion a process that
will culminate in either an internal record if the case is not filed or a public impact
statement at the conclusion of the litigation once a complaint is filed.
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History, U.S. CHEM. SAFETY BD., https://www.csb.gov/about-the-csb/history/
[https://perma.cc/W69T-TS9L] (last visited July 8, 2021) (“The legislative history [behind
the creation of the CSB] states: ‘[T]he investigations conducted by agencies with dual
responsibilities tend to focus on violations of existing rules as the cause of the accident
almost to the exclusion of other contributing factors for which no enforcement or compliance
actions can be taken. The purpose of an accident investigation (as authorized here) is to
determine the cause or causes of an accident whether or not those causes were in violation
of any current and enforceable requirement.’”).
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Completed Investigations, U.S. CHEM. SAFETY BD., https://www.csb.gov/investigat
ions/completed-investigations/?Type=2 [https://perma.cc/FXR2-DANK] (last visited July 8,
2021).
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For a discussion of whether and how impact statements may trigger review under
the APA, see, for example, Thomas E. Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of
Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENV’T. AFFS. L. REV. 63
(1980).
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This approach could be used to establish performance benchmarks at critical
stages of the litigation process with public health interests in mind. It could also be
used to create an internal database to capture lessons learned during the litigation
process and an external database of the final reports to influence future industry and
enforcement behavior. Additionally, it could be used to establish certain procedural
requirements or standards that protect particularly important decisions from a public
health standpoint, such as decisions about secrecy and required stipulations as to
wrongdoing in settlements. Limiting the discretion of the decision-makers in these
key areas as a procedural matter could help the AG in the long run by removing
these decisions as bargaining points in negotiations over settlement.
B. Implementing the Approach
The objectives for this impact analysis framework are to: (1) create an internal
database of information gathered during the litigation process as a way of building
institutional knowledge; (2) create an external database in the form of impact
statements to serve as a public record and to inform future decision-making; (3)
provide a set of guidelines to inform AG involvement in the litigation process;
ensuring they take the public impact of litigation decisions into account; and (4)
require the development and use of metrics beyond dollar amounts of settlements to
evaluate settlement proposals and to inform the structuring of remedies.
This impact analysis framework would, as further described below, begin with
an impact analysis that informs case selection and strategy. It would provide
contracting guidelines and public health metrics to guide the process and require an
impact study to guide remedy design and settlement decisions. It would conclude
with a public impact report.
1. Impact Analysis to Inform Case Selection and Strategy
Since it is both impossible and undesirable for a state AG to use litigation to
address every instance of illegal conduct that causes public health harm, careful case
selection is a critical first step in the litigation process. The challenge here is to
identify cases that yield substantial public health value while also addressing
legitimate constraints on both the private law firm and the state AG (within budget
for the state AG and expected profit for the private law firm). When evaluating
public health value, this type of case selection would be an expected value, construed
broadly and considering consequential results and damages, like the potential for
positive change to the law, deterrence of misconduct, and changes in future
procurement practices by the government.177
177

It is noteworthy that a drug that is marketed off-label or that is not medically
necessary may cause direct damages to the government in terms of payment for that drug.
Yet, there may be other damages incurred by the government if the drug causes injury that
requires treatment whose costs will be borne by the state. Too often, damage modeling does
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Impact analysis would take place first at the point of case selection. The impact
analysis would involve (a) identifying and bringing together state actors whose
constituents are substantially harmed by the misconduct; (b) evaluating the
alternative legal claims and their likelihood of success; (c) assessing the total
magnitude of the harm; and (d) determining what the expected public benefits of
bringing the case will be.
An impact analysis should be done by the AG, and the results retained in an
internal database, even for cases that are ultimately not brought. This will create a
knowledge bank of information about existing and potential wrongdoing that can be
drawn upon when determining enforcement priorities. It will also create an internal
record of decisions that can be used to identify and respond to potential instances of
regulatory capture involving decisions not to pursue cases that are otherwise in the
public interest to pursue.178
Just as medical practitioners have developed the use of checklists to establish
best practices in patient care, part of this impact approach could include the use of a
questionnaire that frames the considerations that should go into the decision of
whether to pursue a case. By identifying the factors that should be considered in case
selection, the questionnaire will frame the decision-making process in a way that
reflects public costs and benefits from the litigation. In addition to ensuring that
decisions involve the requisite balancing of considerations, the answers to the
questionnaire become a source of future knowledge. By saving these questionnaires
and any relevant supporting data in an internal database, the decisions about case
selection as well as the case ideas themselves will become a knowledge bank for
future AGs and their staff.
To determine the real potential impact of a case, it is essential to include an
accurate assessment of legally addressable harm, and this may require including a
broad set of stakeholders at the table for initial case decisions. Considering all the
constituents that should be involved in the impact analysis of a case requires AGs to
adopt a broader view of the stakeholders impacted by public health litigation. As an
example, in the case of healthcare fraud cases—many of which involve states
intervening in qui tam suits initiated by private parties—the state AG often evaluates
the claims with a focus largely confined to Medicaid fraud and without consideration
of other state-funded constituents who are also the subjects of wrongful harm, such
as the employees covered by state employee health and pension boards.179
not account for the full range of damages. Only in the opioid litigation has the government
embarked on an effort that acknowledges that misbranding or unlawful marketing can cause
damages beyond the direct cost of the product.
178
See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Energy Firms in Secretive Alliance with Attorneys General,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us/politics/energy-firmsin-secretive-alliance-with-attorneys-general.html
[https://perma.cc/3TMG-SW43];
Stephenson, supra note 131, at 110.
179
Qui Tam cases under the False Claims Act create a unique set of procedural issues
in that the cases are filed under seal and investigations conducted while a case is sealed.
Hence the orbit of those whom the AG may consult is constrained by court order, most likely
to government bodies.
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If the case appears to be one with a net positive public health impact, the next
step is to consider the nature of the claims that are going to be asserted. Private
interests in reaching a quick monetary settlement might suggest a different, perhaps
narrower, set of claims that capture a slice of the misconduct, but public interests
will take into account the positive public health impact of alternative claim scopes
on the litigation as a whole. This will include an interest in creating a robust public
record of public health harms, an interest in the deterrence and precedential impacts
associated with alternative claims, and consideration of remedies that are likely to
include real structural change.
In developing a standardized format for an impact study of litigation, one of the
biggest challenges is the design of metrics for determining how to value different
factors, such as risk, ability to monitor, expected resources diverted, and alternative
ways of addressing harm in the analysis. The impact study will also need to consider
alternative remedies up front, with some way of incorporating different and
sometimes competing goals, such as the likelihood of recovering damages, general
deterrence, or changing future procurement practices.
2. Guidelines for the Contracting Process with Private Firms
Private law firms may work with AGs either through a statutory relationship
under the state False Claims Act or through a contractual arrangement where the AG
hires the law firm to conduct the litigation. While there has been a great deal of
discussion about the process AGs use or should use to incentivize private law firms
to bring public cases, less attention has focused on the resulting contracts beyond
the scrutiny of the payment structures. State AGs can outsource the litigation, but
they must retain control over the proceedings. The nature of this control and the
ways in which it is exercised during the litigation process are rarely defined in any
detail. Yet this contract offers an opportunity to think about how to structure the
partnership in ways that will best align private interests with public health objectives.
The contract between the AG and the private law firm thus plays an important
role in the process of impact assessment. The first step is to fashion metrics that
capture the public health value of different decisions and to use these metrics as part
of the measure of performance within the contract. If part of the goal is to establish
a robust public record, for example, consideration should be given to how that value
is measured and reflected in the incentive structures that the contract creates.
Even if the contract includes detailed metrics, however, they will not be of
much help without an effective system of monitoring and regular engagement by the
AG’s office in the litigation process. Given the important role that complex litigation
can play as a form of affirmative public health strategy, state AGs should seek to
include attorneys who have a background or some training in complex litigation
strategies as part of their team. Having staff available who are familiar with the
litigation process and can work closely with private firms on complex litigation
matters will allow AGs to play a greater role in monitoring public-private litigation
processes.
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Ensuring that members of the AG’s office remain involved in the litigation is
important not just to ensure monitoring but also to benefit from in-depth learning
about the practices that are causing harm and the sources of this practice. By
contracting out the litigation process in ways that do not keep them involved in the
details of the litigation, AGs distance themselves from the workings of the industries
and companies that are engaging in misconduct. Litigation is, in part, a process of
learning about how corporate actors function, and often the misconduct of one player
implicates others in ways that could and should be factored into enforcement
strategies.180
3. Public Health Metrics for the Process and Its Outcomes
Many of the decisions that are made early in a case, such as the formulation of
the claims that will be included in the complaint, the scope of the alleged harm that
will be included, and early decisions about the discovery process, have important
implications for public health. While private law firms and state AGs may be
interested in a streamlined suit with a quick discovery process and a likely settlement
offer, there may be a public benefit in engaging in extensive discovery with the
public record in mind and an interest in pursuing broader remedies. The value of
creating and making public a detailed record of corporate wrongdoing has been
widely recognized by public health advocates and scholars, for example, but this
value is often neglected by the parties bringing the case.181 In addition to recognizing
the public health impact of different litigation decisions, there needs to be some way
of incorporating these procedural sources of public health value into the litigation
decision-making in a systematic and documented way. This includes (a) establishing
metrics that capture different aspects of the public health value of a procedural
decision, such as a measure of value for limiting a confidentiality order or expanding
the scope of discovery; (b) finding ways of applying these metrics and deriving
180

Consider, for example, the nursing home industry and its relationship to
pharmaceutical companies and long-term care pharmacies. Some nursing homes have been
known to reduce their staff to increase profits. One way of compensating for understaffing
can be to sedate the patients. This creates a mutually beneficial relationship between the
nursing homes and pharmaceutical companies that market drugs like Risperdal, Depakote,
Seroquel used off-label to sedate elderly patients. The nursing home industry and the
pharmaceutical companies have a shared interest in encouraging off-label sales of these
drugs, and long-term care pharmacies facilitate the process of getting these drugs into the
nursing homes. If government lawyers remain distanced from the litigation, they may miss
the broader picture of contributing factors to the overuse of psychotropic drugs in nursing
homes and thus miss an opportunity to address the misconduct not just by nursing homes but
also by pharmaceutical companies and long-term care pharmacies or vice versa. See
Complaint, United States, ex rel, McCoyd v. Abbott Laboratories, No.1:07-cv-00081 (W.D.
Va. Oct 31, 2007), Doc. 54.
181
See, e.g., Oliva, supra note 156; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Settlement with
Favorable Public Health Outcomes at 17–18; In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL
No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio May 9, 2019), ECF No. 1626.
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measures in any given case; and (c) identifying decision points in the litigation
process where consideration of these metrics is required.
As part of this process of establishing broader metrics, one approach might be
to establish a checklist of considerations and certain performance benchmarks to
guide key decisions. Items to include in this checklist can be formulated based on
the critical decisions that must be made at each key decision point in the litigation
process discussed in the prior Section. Inclusion of the item serves as an indication
that the item has significance even if the value is hard to quantify. For example, the
checklist would include questions to be asked at the time of deciding claim scope,
such as: Have you considered the broadest and narrowest claims? Have you explored
the implications of how you formulate the claims for future law change? Another set
of questions would be directed to the time of deciding pre-trial motions and another
set to decisions about discovery.
The checklist of considerations might include certain requirements on actions
as well, such as a requirement to ensure that there is a public stipulation to
wrongdoing where there is misconduct as part of any settlement that is reached.
Having certain requirements in place as a procedural matter has the advantage of
taking them off the bargaining table during negotiations, making them more
attainable than they might otherwise be.
4. Impact Study to Guide Remedy Design and Decisions to Settle
One of the most persistent challenges in public-private health litigation is the
absence of good remedy models to guide the outcomes of these suits, whether
through court order, or most often, through settlement. While the opioid litigations
offer new opportunities for making public health a central focus of settlement
structures, there is little guidance as to what those settlements should look like. One
commentator, looking back on lessons learned from the tobacco settlement,
suggested that AGs do the following:
[T]ask a team of independent experts to determine now the best ways to
monitor the pharmaceutical industry and treat opioid abuse . . . [since] the
skills needed to pursue difficult litigation and negotiate a meaningful
settlement are different to the ones needed to figure out how to reform
complex pharmaceutical marketing and not waste settlement funds that
come to states.182
The need to invest in damage modeling was emphasized earlier. This includes
investments both in systems of data collection, such as government spending on
faulty products and the harm caused by them, and in tools to measure and analyze
harm. The AG can benefit from scale economies in related classes of cases that
182

See, e.g., James E. Tierney, It’s Time to Take on Big Opioid Like We Did with Big
Tobacco, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/james
tierney/its-time-to-take-on-big-opioid [https://perma.cc/FXR2-DANK].
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utilize similar damage models by developing remedy models for classes of cases
instead of individual cases. In addition to damages, remedies need to encompass
structural change. An important aspect of structural change is the need to address
distortions in the standard of care that industry defendants may have created.183
Many cases involving public health harms rely on a showing that the defendants
have departed from established standards of care. But there is no guarantee that the
established standard of care reflects best practices; it simply reflects practices that
are prevalent in the industry. AGs need to play a role in resetting or adjusting the
standard of care where existing practices have lowered it.
5. Ending with a Public Impact Report
The Chemical Health and Safety Board Impact Reports provide a great
illustration of how enforcement efforts can be translated into future changes in
industry risk mitigation and improved industry standards of care through the use of
public impact reports. The idea behind publishing final reports that summarize the
findings of the investigation is to make the broader industry and the public aware of
the health and safety risks of the conduct at issue and to put the industry on notice
that this behavior is not acceptable in the future.
This report should accomplish the following goals: (a) document why the
choice was made to pursue the case; (b) lend transparency to the facts of the case,
including information and evidence secured in discovery; (c) point out where
standards of care, laws, and regulations have been violated while lending
transparency to those schemes used to circumvent requirements; (d) point out
breakdowns in regulatory oversight that may have allowed the violations to occur;
(e) make recommendations for changes in oversight or the amendment of law and/or
regulation; and (f) issue guidance to consumers and the relevant professionals so that
they may be alert to similar violations.
In addition, having a public report that describes the case and its outcome will
serve as a mechanism for increasing the accountability of the AG and will provide
an opportunity for the AG to claim credit for metrics beyond monetary damages.
Knowing that they will have to prepare and publish such a report will serve as a
discipline on the entire litigation process. It will require AGs to be prepared to justify
the decisions that are made and encourage the AGs to build metrics into the contracts
with their private law firm partners that encourage the private attorneys to act in a
way that is consistent with these justifications.

183

The problems are different for different sectors of the health care system. First, all
pharmaceutical marketing derelictions involve two things: (1) actual economic harm, and (2)
distortion of the standard of care. Consider kickbacks. You can measure damages by
projecting the number of scripts that were tainted by proscribed payments. And some effort
is made to do this, although there is no guidance on the discount for litigation risk, so any
settlement number with good optics is acceptable. The problem is that after-time kickbacks
create a standard of care, and after time you can’t tell what created the standard.
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CONCLUSION
While the theoretical debate over when and how private law firms should
litigate state interests continues to rage, in practice, much of the high-impact public
health litigation continues to involve partnerships between federal and state AGs and
private law firms working together to litigate state interests. In this Article, we have
explored why these partnerships are likely to persist and the opportunities that they
offer for reaching public health harms that might otherwise remain unaddressed. But
we have also shown why the resulting litigation, while offering opportunities to
achieve public health goals, is likely to produce suboptimal results from a public
health perspective.
Rather than take the limitations of the litigation process as a given, the Article
provides a novel way of increasing the role of public health considerations
throughout the litigation process. Drawing ideas from impact analysis models that
have worked well in other areas of regulating health and safety, the Article develops
an impact-based approach to litigation that could increase the likelihood that publicprivate litigation partnerships positively impact public health. Given the central role
that public-private litigation has played in exposing some of the most egregious
forms of harm to public health, maximizing the public health impact of the litigation
process should be treated as a public health imperative.

